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RECONCEPTUALISING THE CONTOURS OF 
SELF-DEFENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
VULNERABLE OFFENDERS: A RESPONSE TO THE 
NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION
Nicola Wake and Alan Reed*
Well word gets around in a small, small town
They said he was a dangerous man
But mama was proud and she stood her ground
But she knew she was on the losing end.
Some folks whispered and some folks talked
But everybody looked the other way
And when time ran out there was no one about
On Independence Day.1
Abstract: This article contends that there are compelling reasons for 
reconceptualising the contours of self-defence, and for the introduction 
of a bespoke partial defence complemented by jury directions and the 
admissibility of social framework evidence to assist vulnerable offenders 
who kill their abusers in a desperate attempt to protect themselves. The 
New Zealand Law Commission in 2016 recently recommended, inter alia, 
that self-defence be re-categorised and broadened to allow victims of 
family violence who kill to potentially claim a defence in the absence of an 
imminent threat of harm, standardised on an “all or nothing” perspective. 
In truth, a far wider contextualisation needs to apply, beyond the limited 
and constrained terms of reference before the Commission. The contours 
of self-defence applicability ought to extend to extra-familial vulnerable 
offenders, encompassing individuals subjected to human traffi cking and/
or modern slavery, those trapped by ostensible gang membership, and 
those experiencing third-party abuse who respond with lethal force. It is 
our assertion, after a comparative review of the theoretical and doctrinal 
precepts of a number of alternative legal systems, that the full and partial 
defence schema should be more nuanced. Extant laws fail to appropriately 
recognise the need for a de novo partial defence template and refl ective 
individuated culpability thresholds.
* Dr Nicola Wake is Associate Professor of Law, Northumbria University, United Kingdom. Alan Reed is 
Professor of Criminal and Private International Law and Associate Pro Vice-Chancellor (Research and 
Innovation), Northumbria University, United Kingdom.
1 Martina McBride, “Independence Day”, from the album, The Way That I Am (1994).
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I. Introduction 
This article advances an alternative approach to the New Zealand Law 
Commission’s (the Commission) recent recommendations for victims of family 
violence who commit homicide. New Zealand criminal law is dangerously “out of 
step internationally in how it responds to victims of family violence who kill”,2 and 
the reform recommendations advanced by the Commission are designed to combat 
the issue.3 The report recommends, inter alia, that self-defence be modifi ed to 
ensure that victims of family violence who kill are eligible to claim the defence in 
the absence of an “imminent” threat.4 This change is designed to be complemented 
by reforms to the Evidence Act 2006 and Sentencing Act 2002 to ensure that a 
broad range of family violence evidence is admissible during trial in support of 
the defence, in addition to constituting relevant mitigation at the sentencing stage. 
Other measures include potential changes to Prosecutorial Guidelines and the “three 
strikes” law5 in order to provide a more holistic approach to reform. Unfortunately 
the promulgated reforms are fl awed in failing to consider extra-familial vulnerable 
offenders who kill in self-defence, and in advocating that revised self-defence 
provisions should operate on an “all-or-nothing” basis, whereby the defence either 
succeeds or it fails.6
The proposals advanced herein draw upon experience of self-defence, duress 
and partial defence provisions across New Zealand, Victoria (Australia), Canada, 
the United States, and England and Wales. Importantly the recommendations 
canvassed reject the New Zealand Law Commission’s argument that a lower 
threshold self-defence test should apply to victims of abuse who kill their abuser 
only if a familial link is established. The narrow focus on this discrete category of 
vulnerable offender under the New Zealand Law Commission’s terms of reference 
meant the Commission was unable to “consider the law in respect of other defendants 
who may be less blameworthy in a comparative sense”.7 Real and hypothetical 
scenarios are advanced to demonstrate the extent to which individuals subjected 
to human traffi cking and/or modern-day slavery, those trapped by ostensible gang 
2 Family Violence Death Review Committee (FVDRC), Fourth Annual Report (Health Quality and Safety 
Commission, New Zealand, 2014).
3 Ibid., p.102.
4 New Zealand Law Commission, Understanding Family Violence: Reforming the Criminal Law Relating 
to Homicide (NZ Law Com No 139, 2016).
5 For further discussion, see, Warren Brookbanks, “Three Strikes: New Zealand Experience” (2016) 3(2) 
Journal of International and Comparative Law [***]. 
6 New Zealand Law Commission, Understanding Family Violence (n.4).
7 Ibid., para.1.17.
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membership and those experiencing third-party abuse may similarly respond to 
that abuse with lethal force. In contrast to the Commission’s recommendations, 
compelling arguments are advanced for general as opposed to specifi c reforms to 
self-defence in the context of vulnerable offenders who kill an abuser.
The justifi catory basis for self-defence is revisited, comparing affi rmative self-
defence in Victoria which is available in the context of family violence where the 
threat is not imminent and the force used is excessive, and the position in several 
US states where a partial imperfect self-defence provision operates in this context. 
This comparative analysis reveals that the full and partial defence schema should 
be more nuanced than the New Zealand Law Commission’s report suggests. Even 
if the Commission’s broader self-defence provisions are accepted by the Ministry 
of Justice, they will not assist extra-familial victims of abuse and for intra-familial 
victims, self-defence will not always be available on the facts. That is not to say a 
defence should be available axiomatically. A partial defence ought to be an option, 
and an appropriate, bespoke self-preservation defence is advanced herein.
The partial defence is designed to sit directly beneath self-defence. It would 
operate to reduce a murder conviction to manslaughter where the defendant kills in 
response to a fear of serious abuse from the victim against the defendant or another 
identifi ed individual, but unlike affi rmative self-defence the lack of an imminent 
threat and the use of excessive force would not necessarily negate the defence. The 
absence of imminence and proportionality requirements are justifi ed on the basis 
that self-preservation is a partial rather than a complete defence. In cases where 
the defendant claims to have held a particular belief as regards the circumstances, 
the reasonableness or otherwise of that belief is relevant to the question whether D 
genuinely held it; there must be an intelligible basis for the belief; if it is determined 
that D did genuinely hold it, and there was an intelligible basis for doing so, D is 
entitled to rely on it for the purposes of the partial defence, whether or not it was 
mistaken, or (if it was mistaken) the mistake was a reasonable one to have made. 
Importantly, the defence does not automatically apply where self-defence fails on 
grounds that the threat was not imminent or the force was excessive, otherwise 
the defence would be overly broad in ambit and subject to similar criticisms that 
were levelled at defensive homicide in Victoria.8 Appropriate threshold fi lter 
mechanisms operate to prevent the defence from being available in unmeritorious 
cases. The defence does not apply where the defendant intentionally incited serious 
violence or acted in a considered desire for revenge, and is qualifi ed by a normal 
person test which requires that a person of the defendant’s age with a normal degree 
of tolerance and self-restraint might have reacted in the same or a similar way in the 
8 For discussion see, Madeleine Ulbrick, Asher Flynn and Danielle Tyson, “The Abolition of Defensive 
Homicide: A Step towards Populist Punitivism at the Expense of Mentally Impaired Offenders” (2016) 
40(1) Melbourne University Law Review available at http://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_
fi le/0005/2099390/09-Ulbrick,-Flynn-and-Tyson.pdf. See also Nicola Wake, “‘His Home is His Castle. 
And Mine is a Cage’: A New Partial Defence for Primary Victims Who Kill” (2015) 66(2) Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly149–175.
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circumstances. Psychiatric conditions may be relevant to the normal person test in 
limited circumstances where the condition is especially probative, but evidence of 
voluntary intoxication remains irrelevant. In all cases, the trial judge may decline 
to leave the defence to the jury on the basis that no jury properly directed could 
reasonably conclude that the defence might apply.
II. Background to the Commission’s Issues Paper 
Following earlier recommendations of the Commission,9 and a series of 
controversial cases during which the provocation defence was raised,10 the New 
Zealand government abolished the provocation defence in 2009.11 The Commission 
recommended that repeal of the partial defence be complemented by removal of the 
mandatory life sentence for murder in favour of sentencing discretion, the drafting 
of sentencing and parole guidelines, and reform of self-defence12 designed to better 
accommodate victims of family violence who kill.13 The mandatory life sentence for 
murder was replaced with a presumption in favour of a life sentence, unless “given 
the circumstances of the offence and the offender, a sentence of imprisonment for 
life would be manifestly unjust”.14 Amendments to self-defence, which would have 
ensured the defence was not excluded simply because the threat faced was not 
imminent, were not progressed.
This has resulted in three key issues. The interpretation of self-defence in 
New Zealand continues to render it very diffi cult for the victim of family violence 
to successfully claim the defence; “immediacy of life threatening violence” is 
required in order to justify killing in self-defence; where a viable non-violent 
 9 New Zealand Law Commission, Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered 
Defendants (NZ Law Com No 73, 2001); New Zealand Law Commission, The Partial Defence of 
Provocation (NZ Law Com No 98, 2007).
10 R v Weatherston HC Christchurch CRI-2008-012-137, 30 June 2009; R v Ambach HC Auckland CRI-
2007-004-027374, 18 September 2009. The provocation defence was similarly abolished in England and 
Wales by s.56 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, and replaced by the partial loss of control defence; 
ss.54–55. Earlier controversial cases in England and Wales included, inter alia, R v Smith [2001] 1 AC 
146; and, R v Doughty (1986) 83 Cr App R 319.
11 Crimes (Provocation Repeal) Amendment Bill 2009 (NZ).
12 The Commission recommended that s.48 of the Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) be amended: “to make it clear 
that there can in fact be situations in which the use of force is reasonable even where the danger is not 
imminent but is inevitable”; and, “to require that whenever there is evidence capable of establishing a 
reasonable possibility that a defendant intended to act defensively, the question of whether the force 
used was reasonable is always a question for the jury”; New Zealand Law Commission, Some Criminal 
Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants (n.9) paras.32 and 42.
13 New Zealand Law Commission, The Partial Defence of Provocation (n.9).
14 Sentencing Act 2002, s.102. The Sentencing Council Act 2007 implemented the recommendations made 
by the Sentencing Council Report, “Sentencing Guidelines and Parole Reform” NZLC (August 2006), 
available at http://www.nzlii.org/nz/other/nzlc/report/R94/R94.pdf (visited 27 June 2016). However, the 
Sentencing Council Act 2007 is scheduled to be repealed; New Zealand Law Commission Issues Paper, 
Victims of Family Violence Who Commit Homicide (NZ Law Com IP No 39, 2015), para.4.8.
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option is available the threat is not suffi ciently imminent to satisfy self-defence.15 
Where self-defence fails, there is no partial defence available to the victim of 
family violence, meaning that family violence evidence is considered in sentencing 
mitigation only. Family violence is a relevant factor in determining whether a life 
sentence would be “manifestly unjust”,16 but only “exceptional” circumstances will 
result in rebuttal of the presumption.17 Even in such a case, the victim of family 
violence may be labelled a murderer,18 and the sentence imposed is longer than 
would be imposed if a partial defence were available.19 The position is worse if the 
killing represents a second- or third-strike offence20 where “the court must impose 
life without parole, unless parole ineligibility is manifestly unjust”.21
The leading New Zealand case on self-defence in the context of victims of 
family violence who commit homicide is Wang.22 Wang (the “primary victim”23) was 
convicted of the murder of her husband, following the trial judge’s refusal to leave 
self-defence to the jury. Wang’s husband (the “predominant aggressor”24), whom she 
relied upon heavily because she spoke little English, was sexually, psychologically 
and physically abusive. On the evening of the killing, the predominant aggressor 
forced Wang to telephone Hong Kong and demand money from family members, 
15 R v Wang [1990] 2 NZLR 529 (CA).
16 Hamidzadeh v R [2013] 2 NZLR 137, [5]. Sentencing Act 2002, ss.103 and 104. See, generally, Geoff 
Hall, Sentencing: 2007 Reforms in Context (Wellington, LexisNexis, 2007) p.487.
17 In R v Law (2002) 19 CRNZ 500, the mercy killing of an elderly woman suffering from Alzheimer’s 
Disease by her husband, attracted an 18-months-term of imprisonment. See also, Reid HC Auckland CRI-
2008-090-2203, 4 February 2011 (confessing to a crime that might not have otherwise been discovered 
and attempting suicide after the offence indicated signifi cant remorse. The defendant suffered from major 
depression and psychotic delusions); R v McNaughton [2012] NZHC 815 (peripheral role as a secondary 
party, previous good character, evident remorse, restorative justice conference held with the victim); 
R v Nelson [2012] NZHC 3570 (defi ciency in decision-making faculties, youth, inability to process 
information, tumultuous family situation); see, generally, Rajesh Chhana, Philip Spier, Susan Roberts 
and Chris Hurd, The Sentencing Act 2002: Monitoring the First Year (Ministry of Justice, 2004).
18 It is recognised that manslaughter verdicts are returned in a number of such cases; New Zealand Law 
Commission, Understanding Family Violence (n.4) p.4. It is believed that this may be, in part, a result of 
jury nullifi cation; New Zealand Law Commission Issues Paper, Victims of Family Violence Who Commit 
Homicide (n.14).
19 For further discussion see, Wake, “His Home is His Castle. And Mine is a Cage” (n.8).
20 Brookbanks notes:
“What is especially disturbing about this regime as it applies to homicide offences, is that there is 
absolutely no scope for mitigation once a second or third strike has been triggered. So whether the 
killing is the mercy killing by an elderly man of his aged, dementing wife, the killing by a woman 
of her bullying and abusive partner, a killing in excessive self-defence or the cold-blooded slaying 
of a child by a hardened criminal, it will make no difference in terms of the sentence the court is 
mandated to impose.”
 Brookbanks, “Three Strikes” (n.5). 
21 Ibid. 
22 Wang (n.15).
23 The primary victim is an individual subjected to “ongoing, coercive and controlling behaviour from their 
intimate partner”; FVDRC, Fourth Annual Report (n.2) p.15.
24 Ibid.: The principal aggressor in the relationship who exhibits “a pattern of violence to exercise coercive 
control” over the “primary victim”.
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and he threatened to kill both Wang and her sister, before retiring to bed in an 
intoxicated state. Wang attempted to suffocate him, before stabbing him several 
times, and then smothering him with a pillow. The trial judge advised that if Wang’s 
version of events was believed, there was “ample evidence” of the predominant 
aggressor’s “prior threatening behaviour”.25 Psychiatric testimony described Wang 
as having a major depressive illness which meant that she would have believed not 
only that the threats would be carried out, but also that “the only course she could 
think of was to kill her husband”.26
Wang attempted to rely on s.48 of the Crimes Act 1961 which provides 
that “everyone is justifi ed in using, in the defence of himself or another such 
force, as in the circumstances as he or she believes them to be it is reasonable to 
use”.27 The trial judge, however, refused to leave self-defence to the jury on the 
basis that there were “alternative courses open to her” meaning that the “only 
view on the evidence” was that Wang “was in no immediate danger”.28 The trial 
judge said:
“Her sister and her friend Susan were both in the house. She could have 
woken them and sought their help and advice. She could have left the 
house taking her sister with her in the car which was available. She could 
have gone to acquaintances in Christchurch or to the police”.29
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the trial judge, stating:
“In our view what is reasonable force to use to protect oneself or another 
when faced with a threat of physical force must depend on the imminence 
and seriousness of the threat and the opportunity to seek protection without 
recourse to the use of force. There may well be a number of alternative 
courses of action open, other than the use of force, to a person subjected 
to a threat which cannot be carried out immediately. If so, it will not be 
reasonable to make a pre-emptive strike”.30
There are three fundamental and inter-related issues with this approach. First, it 
ignores the overarching, ongoing threat of family violence; its “systematic nature” 
distinguishes it from other forms of violent conduct;31 it represents an “omnipresent 
threat which has the potential to crystalize at any point in time and which the police 
25 Wang (n.15).
26 R v Wang HC Christchurch T 40/88, 27 February–6 March 1989 (trial rulings) 10.
27 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), s.48(1).
28 Wang (n.26), 11.
29 Wang (n.15).
30 Wang (n.15), 535–536.
31 Victor Tadros, “The Distinctiveness of Domestic Abuse: A Freedom Based Account” (2004–2005) 
65 Louisiana Law Review 989.
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are unable to defuse”.32 Second, it remains unresolved whether deadly force would 
be regarded reasonable in cases in which the victim of family violence fears sexual 
assault, imprisonment or repeated assaults not amounting to serious bodily harm.33 
Commentators have vehemently argued that it may be reasonable for an individual 
to kill an aggressor who is attempting to rape him/her.34 The line of reasoning is 
not found in the psychological or physiological impact of the rape, but “the sheer 
use of a person, and in that sense the objectifi cation of a person, is a denial of 
their personhood. It is literally dehumanising”.35 The “social meaning of sexual 
penetration” elucidates the concept of “sheer use”, and differentiates rape from the 
“family of assault crimes”.36 Third, the ostensible “alternative option” is not always 
available; family violence may be viewed as “a complex form of entrapment”, 
inclusive of “severe victimisation”, “social isolation”, and “extreme economic 
deprivation” rendering the victim unable to escape or conditioning him/her into 
believing it is impossible to do so.37 In many cases a victim of family violence may 
be in greater danger if they attempt to leave.38
When a victim of family violence kills, the “immediate assault [may] appear 
relatively minor, or they may respond at a time when the violence has ceased. 
They may arm themselves in anticipation of an attack, or they may act to protect 
themselves by a pre-emptive strike”.39 The imminence requirement encourages 
reference to the immediate incident, simultaneously ignoring the cumulative 
impact of past abuse, and implying the availability of alternative options.40 This 
approach misunderstands the nature of family violence which, described as 
“intimate terrorism”, engages a broad range of tactics, not limited to violence, in 
order to assert dominion over an intimate partner.41 Predominant aggressors have 
been colloquially referred to as intimate terrorists in this regard.42 The literature not 
only recognises divergent manifestations of family violence, but also differences 
across predominant aggressors. Predominant aggressors (or “intimate terrorists”) 
have been referred to as “emotional dependents” (or “pitbulls”) so attached to 
32 FVDRC, Fourth Annual Report (n.2) submission 20. 
33 New Zealand Law Commission Preliminary Paper, “Battered Defendants Victims of Domestic Violence 
Who Offend” (NZ Law Com PP 41, 2000), para.49, available at http://www.nzlii.org/nz/other/nzlc/pp/
PP41/PP41-3_.html (visited 23 June 2016).
34 For further discussion see, Fiona Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006) ch.8. 
35 John Gardner and Stephen Shute, “The Wrongness of Rape” in Jeremy Horder (ed), Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) p.205, cited in Leverick, ibid.
36 Ibid., p.212.
37 FVDRC, Fourth Annual Report (n.2) pp.18, 80. For further discussion see, FVDRC, Fifth Annual Report 
(Health Quality and Safety Commission, New Zealand, 2016).
38 Gardner and Shute “The Wrongness of Rape” (n.35) p.212, cited in Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence (n.34).
39 New Zealand Law Commission, Understanding Family Violence (n.4) para.6.18.
40 Ibid., paras.6.19 and 6.20.
41 Project Safe, “Domestic Violence,” available at http://www.project-safe.org/domestic-violence/ (visited 
23 June 2016).
42 Ibid.
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their victims they engage in violence in order to prevent them from leaving, and 
“sociopaths” (or “cobras”) who seek to control all aspects of the primary victim’s 
life, particularly in relationship contexts.43 A signifi cant number of predominant 
aggressors may engage in behaviours attendant to both subsets. In sociopathic 
cases, it is often more diffi cult to identify the abuse, particularly where that abuse 
must translate as life threatening for the purposes of self-defence.
In terms of alternative escape options, Wright has argued that a mistake as 
to whether alternative options are available (as the trial judge intimated was the 
case in Wang) ought to be treated in the same way as other mistaken beliefs. The 
general approach to mistaken belief is that “an honest belief in a state of affairs 
or as to the existence of a fact, which if true would make the act innocent, will 
provide a defence itself”.44 It is unnecessary to “establish reasonable grounds” 
for the belief although reasonableness “may be relevant in testing the honesty 
of the belief”.45 In the context of potential escape avenues, whether the primary 
victim is mistaken has been approached by asking whether a reasonable person 
might have made the same error.46 Wright suggests the court ought to take 
“any material mistakes of fact into account when deciding whether a person’s 
actions were reasonable. These may include mistakes about whether a particular 
alternative to using force was available. The only limit to what can be a belief 
about circumstances is that the belief has to be about something that is logically 
connected to the objective reasonableness of force”.47 Jurisprudential authorities, 
however, have since clarifi ed that in assessing whether force is reasonable 
requires consideration of “whether there were alternative courses of action of 
which [the defendant] was aware”.48
Notwithstanding the problems with the “imminence” requirement, in the 
25 years since Wang was decided, case law49 has confi rmed that “imminence”50 and 
lack of alternatives remain necessary elements of self-defence.51 The most recent 
43 Ibid.
44 Millar v Ministry of Transport [1986] 1 NZLR 660, 673 (McMullin J).
45 Ibid.
46 Jenkins v Police (1986) 2 CRNZ 196. Wang (n.15):
“One could not reasonably have considered that those threats might be carried out by him, ‘at any 
moment’, in his then state, nor when his aim was to extort money from her sister in Hong Kong. 
There was no immediate danger to render causing his death a reasonable course of action”.
47 Fran Wright, “The Circumstances as She Believed Them to Be: A Reappraisal of Section 48 of the Crimes 
Act 1961” [1998] Waikato Law Review 6, 109.
48 R v Afamasaga [2014] NZHC 2142, [43]–[50].
49 See, for example, Vincent v R [2015] NZCA 201 (CA); Vincent v R [2016] NZSC 15 (SC); Afamasaga 
v R (2015) 27 CRNZ 640; Leason v Attorney-General [2014] 2 NZLR 224; R v Sila [2009] NZCA 233; 
R v Hackell CA131/02, 10 October 2002 and R v Kneale [1998] 2 NZLR 169 (CA).
50 Although cf. Zhou HC Auckland T 7/93, 8 October 1993; R v Oakes [1995] 2 NZLR 673 (CA). See also, 
New Zealand Ministry of Justice Criminal Defences Discussion Paper, Provocation and Other Partial 
Defences, Self Defence, and Defences of Duress (2003) p.8.
51 New Zealand Law Commission, Understanding Family Violence (n.4) paras.6.29 and 6.41.
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rulings on these issues arose in the cases of Vincent52 and Afamasaga.53 Vincent was 
convicted of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm after he repeatedly 
stabbed a fellow prison inmate in the neck four days after an altercation involving 
a basketball.54 The Court of Appeal stated: “The defendant must have seen himself 
or herself as under a real threat of danger and not merely believe there may be 
some future danger”.55 The Court of Appeal noted that Vincent stabbing the victim 
four times in the back of the neck “could not possibly be seen as a reasonable 
or proportionate response to a perceived threat of attack from a basketball in the 
exercise yard”.56 The Supreme Court dismissed Vincent’s application for leave to 
appeal earlier this year.57
The same approach was adopted when Afamasaga, a gang member, 
unsuccessfully attempted to claim self-defence after he shot a rival gang member 
from a darkened bedroom at a distance of 10–12 metres. According to his evidence, 
Afamasaga feared for his life on the basis that he thought he saw a pistol in the 
victim’s hands. The trial judge asserted:
“Whether the force used was reasonable, will require consideration of 
the perceived imminence of the seriousness of the attack or anticipated 
attack, whether the defensive reaction was reasonably proportionate to the 
perceived danger and whether there were alternative courses of action of 
which Mr Afamasaga was aware”.58
The Court of Appeal dismissed Afamasaga’s appeal against the judge’s direction 
noting that the elements of self-defence had been correctly explained to the jury. 
The Commission stated that these cases, not being concerned with victims of 
family violence, advance “general statements about the law on self-defence that 
could apply equally to a defendant in that context”.59 Given the rarity of cases 
where a victim of family violence kills their abuser (1–2 per year on average in 
New Zealand), it is unlikely that the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court will have 
an opportunity to review the approach in that specifi c context in the near future.60
In contrast to the imminence requirement, the reasonableness element of self-
defence represents less of a problem for victims of family violence who attempt 
to invoke the defence. The Court in Afamasaga expressed that what is required 
52 Vincent (CA) (n.49); Vincent (SC) (n.49).
53 Afamasaga (n.49).
54 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), s.188.
55 Vincent (CA) (n.49), [28]. See also R v Savage [1991] 3 NZLR 155, 158.
56 Vincent (CA) (n.49), [33].
57 Vincent (SC) (n.49), [9], [10].
58 Afamasaga (n.48), [68].
59 New Zealand Law Commission, Understanding Family Violence (n.4) para.6.41.
60 Ibid., para.10.108 and para.6.41. The New Zealand Law Commission identifi ed 23 recorded cases of 
victims of family violence who committed homicide between 2001–2015; New Zealand Law Commission 
Issues Paper, Victims of Family Violence Who Commit Homicide (n.14), Appendix B
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is “reasonable proportionality”, meaning the level of force used might still be 
regarded reasonable even though it is disproportionate.61 This is important because 
it allows for an assessment of the “physical limitations” of a victim of family 
violence,62 in addition to the impact of the history of abuse. The Commission is of 
the view that: “reasonable proportionality” is “capable of accommodating victims 
of family violence”,63 but legislative reform is required to address the “imminence 
requirement”, whilst education and the admission of expert evidence on the nature 
of family abuse will assist in assessing “reasonable proportionality”.64
In November 2015, and in response to the Family Violence Death Review 
Committee report, identifying that “Aotearaa New Zealand is out of step” 
internationally in how it responds to victims of family violence who kill,65 the 
Commission was asked, “as a matter of priority”, to consider “the position of 
victims of family violence (almost overwhelmingly women) who are driven to 
commit homicide, and what the consequences in law of their actions should be”.66 
The terms of reference related to whether:
“(a) the test for self-defence, in section 48 of the Crimes Act 1961, should be 
modifi ed so that it is more readily accessible to victims of family violence 
charged with murder (or manslaughter); (b) a partial defence that would 
reduce murder to manslaughter is justifi ed, and, if so, in what particular 
circumstances; and (c) current sentencing principles properly refl ect the 
circumstances of victims of family violence who are convicted of murder”.67
The subsequent report, published in 2016, advanced as its main recommendation 
that in cases involving family violence, self-defence ought to be available to victims 
even when they are responding to a threat that is not “imminent”.68 The other 
recommendations include the provision of education and training for members of 
the legal profession,69 amendments to the Evidence Act 2006 to allow a wide range 
of family violence evidence to be submitted in support of self-defence claims, and 
reforms to the Sentencing Act 2002 to foster consistent assessment of family violence 
history as relevant mitigation. The report also advises that the Solicitor-General 
should, upon the next review of prosecutorial guidelines, consider whether express 
reference to family violence history ought to be included, in addition to advocating 
61 Afamasaga (n.48), cited in New Zealand Law Commission, Understanding Family Violence (n.4) 
para.6.54.
62 Oakes (n.50).
63 New Zealand Law Commission, Understanding Family Violence (n.4) para.6.62.
64 Ibid., para.6.92.
65 FVDRC, Fourth Annual Report (n.2) p.102.
66 New Zealand Law Commission Issues Paper, Victims of Family Violence Who Commit Homicide 
(n.14) p.iii.
67 Ibid.
68 New Zealand Law Commission, Understanding Family Violence (n.4).
69 Ibid., R1–R4.
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that the Ministry of Justice assess whether the “three strikes” legislation should 
be amended to allow judges to impose a sentence other than life imprisonment in 
appropriate cases. The report expressly advised against the introduction of a new 
partial defence or separate homicide offence, and declined to consider offenders 
vulnerable by reason(s) other than family violence.
III. Vulnerable Offenders 
The Commission’s terms of reference were “limited to the specifi c category of 
victims of family violence who have killed their abusers”.70 The Commission 
explained that the term “victim of family violence” encompasses all individuals 
who have suffered abuse, irrespective of whether that individual is an adult or child 
or the abuse is perpetuated by a parent, partner or another family member.71 The 
term “abuser” refers to all perpetrators irrespective of their relationship with the 
victim.72 The recommendations are limited to killings in response to intra-familial 
violence, child abuse and neglect, and intimate partner violence. Despite recognising 
the “potential for unintended consequences that necessarily arise whenever the 
law is of specifi c, rather than of general, application”, the scope of the terms of 
reference meant the Commission was unable to “consider the law in respect of 
other defendants who may be less blameworthy in a comparative sense”.73
The narrow focus on victims of family violence potentially neglects other 
vulnerable offenders who may kill in fear of an abuser, since the absence of a 
familial link or guardian/intimate relationship means that the recommended reforms 
will not apply. Although “there is disagreement on the range of groups suffering 
vulnerability and on its sources, there is general agreement that vulnerability is an 
important concept capturing the dynamic way that people’s well-being in today’s 
world is affected by wider changes in the economic, fi nancial, social, institutional, 
cultural and environmental sphere”.74 The focus of this article is on victims of family 
violence in addition to those who fi nd themselves in an analogous situation,75 but 
for the family link. Individuals subjected to human traffi cking and/or modern-day 
slavery, those trapped by ostensible gang membership (where the member is actually 
a victim of the gang), and those experiencing third-party abuse may be regarded 
vulnerable consequent upon their situation.76 These situations are non-exhaustive 
but are used to highlight the problems associated with focusing solely upon victims 
70 Ibid., p.5.
71 Ibid., para.1.1.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., para.1.17.
74 Peadar Kirby, Vulnerability and Violence: The Impact of Globalization (London: Pluto Press, 2006).
75 Ministry of Social Development, “Background to Family Violence Indicators”, available at www.msd.
govt.nz (visited 24 June 2016).
76 Helen Innes and Martin Innes, Personal, Situational and Incidental Vulnerabilities to ASB Harm: a follow 
up study (Universities Police Science Institute, January 2013) p.3. 
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of family violence. It is also recognised that, inter alia, personal, social, cultural 
and economic factors may render these individuals innately vulnerable, and policy 
may reaffi rm individual or group vulnerabilities.77 By reducing the evaluation 
to situational vulnerability, however, it is possible to identify how new reforms 
should apply across individuals without engaging in an assessment of the merits or 
demerits of who is in a “worse” position; the approach engages a simple enquiry 
into whether individuals in the same or a similar situation ought to receive the 
compassion of the law. Sadly, the situations identifi ed represent growing problems 
within contemporary society at a global level.
A. Human traffi  cking and modern-day slavery 
It would be a mistake to assume that human traffi cking is a rare occurrence, 
particularly in destination countries, such as New Zealand and the United Kingdom. 
Early in 2016, in what has been dubbed New Zealand’s fi rst human-traffi cking case, 
Kulwant Singh was imprisoned for over two years as a consequence of his “critical” 
involvement in traffi cking 25 workers into New Zealand.78 Two traffi ckers have also 
been convicted in child sex-traffi cking cases, highlighting that human traffi cking 
is a live issue in New Zealand. The New Zealand Law Society has suggested these 
cases may be “merely the tip of the iceberg and New Zealand should have growing 
concern about human traffi cking and forced labour exploitation”.79
Early in 2016, the Director for Public Prosecutions in England and Wales, the 
Lord Advocate in Scotland and the Public Prosecutor for Northern Ireland signed 
action plans committing their respective organisations “to work together in order 
to react to the changing nature of traffi cking around the world”.80 This follows 
77 Ibid.
78 Jess Pullar, “Man Jailed for False Refugee Claims in Landmark Human Traffi cking Trial” Stuff NZ (29 
January 2016), available at http://www.stuff.co.nz/nelson-mail/news/76386522/Man-jailed-for-false-
refugee-claims-in-landmark-human-traffi cking-trial; and Charles Anderson and Jess Pullar, “Trio Plead 
Not Guilty in New Zealand’s First Human Traffi cking Trial” Stuff NZ (9 November 2015), available 
at http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/73817107/trio-plead-not-guilty-in-new-zealands-fi rst-human-
traffi cking-trial.html (visited 24 June 2016).
79 New Zealand Law Society, “Modern Day Slavery and Human Traffi cking” (26 September 2014), 
available at https://www.lawsociety.org.nz/lawtalk/lawtalk-archives/issue-851/modern-day-slavery-and-
human-traffi cking (visited 14 December 2015).
80 Crown Prosecution Service, Traffi cking Prosecutions on the Rise as British Prosecutors Sign Up to New 
Anti-traffi cking Commitments (26 February 2016):
“Month-on-month the number of defendants being taken to court for traffi cking offences is higher 
than ever before. 183 people were taken to court for traffi cking offences between April 2015 and 
December 2015 while 187 people were taken to court for traffi cking offences for the whole of 
2014-15. In 2014 there were 1,139 victims of traffi cking for sexual exploitation, while victims of 
labour exploitation (1,017) and domestic servitude (278) were 1,295 combined. In April to June 
2015 labour exploitation was 253 and sexual exploitation 248. Domestic servitude was 115”.
See also, Emma Batha, “Traffi cking Prosecutions Hit Record in England and Wales Following Slavery 
Law” Thomson Reuters (26 February 2016), available at http://news.trust.org/item/20160226152555-
0hu9x (visited 24 June 2016).
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the implementation of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. In addition to criminalising 
human traffi cking, the landmark Act criminalises holding another person in slavery 
or servitude, or requiring another person to perform forced or compulsory labour in 
circumstances in which the person knows or ought to know the other person is held 
in slavery or servitude.81 The overlap between the experiences of family violence 
victims and traffi cking victims is evident in the fi rst case involving the new offence. 
Safraz Ahmed was convicted of forcing his spouse, Sumara Iram, into domestic 
servitude, after subjecting her to “physical and mental torture” over a two-year-
period. The court heard that Ahmed beat his wife, threw tins of cat food at her, sent 
numerous abusive and demeaning text messages, and told her to kill herself on more 
than one occasion. Sumara vividly captured her coercive and violent entrapment in 
the following stark description:
“Because the beatings happened so regularly and for such small things 
I felt worthless. I was not allowed to do what I wanted to do, I was 
never allowed to step out of the house alone and I was not allowed to 
make friends, which means I was never allowed to socialise; I felt like 
their prisoner. I cooked, I cleaned, I washed, I ironed, looked after other 
people’s children and when things were not to the liking of the family I 
was punished by beatings. I felt that there was only one purpose of my life 
and that was to serve his family”.82
Ahmed was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for enforced domestic servitude, 
and eight months’ for assault occasioning actual bodily harm for breaking Sumara’s 
nose.83 The entrapment experienced by Sumara is comparable to the entrapment 
experienced by victims of human traffi cking and domestic violence. Victims may 
be conditioned into believing their sole purpose is to serve, and they may feel there 
is no way out. In the traffi cking context, victims are likely to fear they will not be 
believed or they will be punished by the authorities if they seek help or try to 
escape; although the domestic servitude provisions were utilised in the context 
of family violence in Ahmed’s case, they are also designed to apply to servitude 
outwith familial constructs, and in traffi cking contexts.
That victims of family violence and human traffi cking may experience similar 
forms of abuse is also implicit in defi nitional constructs attached to these behaviours. 
81 Modern Slavery Act 2015, s.1(a) and 1(b). It was explained in CN v United Kingdom (2013) 56 EHRR 
24 that “domestic servitude is distinct from traffi cking and exploitation and involves a complex set 
of dynamics, involving both overt and more subtle forms of coercion, to force compliance.” Human 
traffi cking, domestic servitude and domestic abuse are not the same thing, but there are undoubtedly 
similarities across the experiences suffered by victims in these contexts. 
82 Peter Walker, “Briton Who Made Wife Live Like Slave is First to be Jailed for Domestic Servitude” 
The Guardian (1 April 2016), available at http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/apr/01/man-made-
wife-live-like-slave-domestic-servitude-faces-jail (visited 24 June 2016).
83 Ibid.
JICL-3(2)_3 Reconceptualising by Nicola Wake and Alan Reed.indd   13 15/10/16   5:22 PM
14 Journal of International and Comparative Law
Threats, force, coercion, control, abuse of power, exploitation, patterns of harm 
and entrapment are terms that have been adopted to describe family violence and 
human traffi cking. The Traffi cking Protocol defi nes human traffi cking as:
“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, 
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefi ts to achieve 
the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose 
of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation 
of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced 
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the 
removal of organs”.84 (Emphasis added.)
In England and Wales, human traffi cking is criminalised under s.2 of the Modern 
Slavery Act 2015; an offence is committed if D arranges or facilitates the travel of V 
by recruiting, transporting or transferring, harbouring or receiving, or transferring 
or exchanging control over V, intending to exploit V (in any part of the world) 
during or after the travel, or where D knows or ought to know that another person is 
likely to exploit D in such circumstance; whether V consents to travel is irrelevant. 
In the context of family violence, both the Commission and the FVDRC 
identify the need for a cultural shift in contemporary understanding of family 
violence: intimate partner violence ought to be viewed as “a pattern of harm, 
rather than as a series of incidents”; “the individual is subjected to a broad range 
of controlling behaviours, commonly of a physical, sexual and/or psychological 
nature, which typically involve fear, intimidation and emotional deprivation”. In 
order to understand victims’ responses, it is necessary to view family violence as “a 
form of entrapment” as opposed to explaining the victims’ response by reference to 
“learned helplessness and battered woman syndrome”.85
It is noteworthy that express reference is made to the term “control” in both 
defi nitions, and “coercion” forms an essential aspect of the traffi cking defi nition. 
These similarities are poignant given that contemporary understanding of family 
violence refl ects control and coercion as integral to such behaviour. Legislative 
support for this contention is to be found in the Serious Crimes Act 2015 (England 
and Wales, s.76), considered further in Section IV(A) (see p.xxx below), which 
criminalises repeated and continuous controlling or coercive behaviour in the 
context of intimate relationships. These comparative defi nitions further support the 
view that victims of family violence and victims of human traffi cking may fi nd 
themselves in similar situations, experiencing similar emotions.
84 United Nations, The Palermo Protocol: The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traffi cking in 
Persons Especially Women and Children (2002).
85 New Zealand Law Commission, Understanding Family Violence (n.4) para.2.24 [authors’ emphasis added].
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The problem is that the reforms promulgated by the Commission are restricted 
to victims of family violence. Under the Commission’s recommendations, self-
defence would likely be available to an individual in Sumara’s situation if she 
killed her abuser given the pattern of abuse suffered even if the threat was not 
imminent and/or the force used was excessive. If, however, the same situation 
arose, but Sumara was not in a relationship with Ahmed, and had instead been 
traffi cked for the purposes of being forced into domestic servitude the threat 
would need to be imminent before self-defence could apply (A form of quasi self-
defence might have been provided under s.45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 
(England and Wales) if murder was not excluded from its ambit by Sch.4. A victim 
of human traffi cking is entitled to a defence where she has been compelled to 
commit a qualifying offence (note the limitations in Sch.4) consequent on slavery 
or exploitation, and a reasonable person, sharing relevant characteristics, and in 
the same situation would have no realistic alternative to doing the act. Note that 
under s.2 a person may be compelled to do something by another person or as a 
result of circumstances for the purposes of the Act). The situational distinction 
between family violence and human traffi cking cases is not only weak, it is apt to 
cause injustice.
The inherent unfairness in enacting specifi c, as opposed to general reform in 
this context, is further demonstrated in the following victim testimonies, derived 
from the US Department of State, Traffi cking in Persons Report 2015. The report 
notes that the testimonies are designed to be “illustrative only”.86 For present 
purposes, these illustrations are used to highlight situations where, were the victim 
to use lethal force, in order to affect an escape, most would expect that some 
form of mitigation ought to be available.87 When considered in the context of the 
Commission’s recommendations, these illustrations arguably render it diffi cult to 
justify the limitation placed upon the reforms advanced:
 (1)  Natalie and Dara, at the age of 16, eager to earn money and go to school, 
left Nigeria with the help of men who arranged their travel and convinced 
them good jobs awaited them in Cote d’Ivoire. Once there, Natalie and 
Dara were instead forced to have sex with men every night to pay back a 
$2,600 “travel debt”.88
(2)  When 14 years old, Cara met Max while on vacation in Greece with 
her mother. She fell in love with him and, after only a few weeks, 
Max persuaded her to move in with him, rather than return to England. 
86 US Department of State, “Traffi cking in Persons Report” (2015), available at http://www.state.gov/j/tip/
rls/tiprpt/2015/243362.htm (visited 14 December 2015).
87 Thankfully, support was afforded to these victims before the situations reached the level of lethal violence; 
ibid. Unfortunately, this is not always the case, and, as such, it is appropriate that defences are available to 
those who kill in similar circumstances. 
88 This example is taken verbatim US Department of State, Traffi cking in Persons Report (n.86) [note, the 
age of the victims was added by the authors].
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He soon broke his promise to take care of her and forced Cara to have 
sex with strangers. Max fi rst convinced her that the money she made 
was helping to keep them together; he later threatened to kill her 
mother if she tried to stop. In time, Max gave Cara to another traffi cker 
who forced her to send postcards to her mother depicting a happy life 
in Athens.89
(3)  Tanya was only 11 years old when her mother traded her to a drug dealer 
for sex, in exchange for heroin. Tanya was raped, forced to commit sexual 
acts whilst being video recorded, and made to take heroin.90
 (4)  At 13 years old, Effi a moved to the United States with family friends, 
excited to learn English and go to school — something her parents in 
Ghana could not afford. When she arrived, these so-called friends forbade 
her from attending school and forced her to clean, cook and watch their 
children for up to 18 hours a day. The father physically and sexually 
abused her. Effi a received no payment and could not use the telephone or 
go outside.91
One evening, when they could take no more, Natalie and Dara poured petrol 
over the men and set them on fi re whilst they were sleeping, killing them. After 
writing another postcard to her mother, Cara returned the pen to the kitchen, 
collected a knife and stabbed the traffi cker fi ve times in the back, killing him. 
Tanya laced a bottle of beer with drugs, after the drug dealer demanded she 
bring him another bottle of beer, inducing a fatal overdose. Effi a knew that she 
could not overpower her abuser so she took one of the children’s baseball bats 
and repeatedly hit him over the head with it while he was sleeping, inducing 
fatal injuries.
It is important to note at the outset that the age of these children would not 
provide them with a defence. Being set at 10 years, the notoriously low age of 
criminal responsibility in New Zealand mirrors the position in England and Wales.92 
The position differs insofar as children aged between 10 and 11 years may only be 
charged with murder93 or manslaughter in New Zealand, whereas there is no such 
restriction in England and Wales.
In terms of establishing whether self-defence might be available, none of these 
cases involved an “imminent” threat in the sense required for the purposes of self-
defence in New Zealand. Varying degrees of premeditation are apparent in each 
of the cases. In three of the four cases, a weapon was used. In all of the cases, 
the abuser was off-guard. Based upon the law as it currently stands, it is unlikely 
89 Ibid.
90 This example is derived, mutatis mutandis, US Department of State, Traffi cking in Persons Report (n.86).
91 This example is taken verbatim US Department of State, Traffi cking in Persons Report (n.86).
92 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), ss.21 and 22(1).
93 Francine Chye, “When Children Kill: The Age of Criminal Responsibility and Criminal Procedure in 
New Zealand” [2012] NZLawStuJl 8; (2012) 2 NZLSJ 837.
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that any of the individuals in the examples posited would be able to successfully 
claim self-defence. With the exception of Tanya’s case, where it might be argued 
that her intention was to incapacitate the abuser in order to effect an escape, a 
manslaughter verdict on the basis that the defendant(s) lacked the requisite mens rea 
for murder is unlikely (assuming jury nullifi cation does not occur) given that there 
is, arguably, clear evidence of intention in each case.94 In the absence of a partial 
defence, the abuse suffered would need to be considered in order to determine 
whether the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment is “manifestly unjust”; 
a determination that rebuts the presumption of a life sentence in murder cases will 
only occur in exceptional cases, and even then, the sentence imposed is likely to be 
longer than the sentence that would be imposed were a partial defence available.95 
The irony is that under the Commission’s proposals, were Natalie, Dara, Cara, 
Tanya, and Effi a to have a familial connection with their abuser, a lower-threshold 
test, considered further in Section IV, would apply in the context of self-defence not 
on the basis of any reduction in their respective culpability level(s), but on the basis 
that their abuser is related to them in some way. This would render an acquittal 
more likely in each case. This distinction cannot be justifi ed.
B. Ostensible gang membership 
The second category of case in which this distinction cannot be justifi ed is in 
the context of ostensible gang membership. It is important to note that although 
criminal gangs may exploit victims of human traffi cking, not all gangs are involved 
in human traffi cking. All criminal gangs may create or foster a situation whereby 
ostensible members are, in fact, victims of the gang who feel unable to escape. This 
category covers both traffi cking victims and non-traffi cking victims who might 
fairly be regarded as ostensible gang members, as a consequence of being subjected 
to coercive and controlling behaviour by members of the gang resulting in the 
victim believing that there is no way to escape.
The notion that a gang member might be regarded vulnerable is controversial 
for two principal reasons. First, the criminal justice response to gang membership 
has witnessed an overzealous application of what has been termed “parasitic 
94 Culpable homicide is murder in each of the following cases:
(1) if the offender means to cause the death of the person killed; 
(2)  if the offender means to cause to the person killed any bodily injury that is known to the offender 
to be likely to cause death, and is reckless whether death ensues or not; 
(3)  if the offender means to cause death, or, being so reckless as aforesaid, means to cause such bodily 
injury as aforesaid to one person, and by accident or mistake kills another person, though he or she 
does not mean to hurt the person killed; and
(4)  if the offender for any unlawful object does an act that he or she knows to be likely to cause death, 
and thereby kills any person, though he or she may have desired that his or her object should be 
effected without hurting anyone.
 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), s.167.
95 For discussion see, Wake, “His Home is His Castle. And Mine is a Cage” (n.8).
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accessorial liability” in order to erroneously convict gang members of criminal acts, 
whilst simultaneously excluding the availability of certain defences predicated on 
the defendant’s prior fault in voluntarily associating with a gang.96 Earlier this year, 
the Supreme Court, in R v Jogee, the English case, ruled that the common law had 
taken a “wrong turn” as regards “parasitic accessorial liability”. This may concern 
any secondary party to a crime, but it is most applicable in the context of gang 
membership. The issue arises where a secondary party or “secondary parties who 
have been engaged with one or more others in a criminal venture to commit crime 
A, but in doing so the principal commits a second crime, crime B”.97 In a signifi cant 
number of the reported cases, crime B is murder committed during the course of 
some other criminal venture, but the legal principle is applicable to all criminal 
offences. In the 1985 and 1999 cases of Chan Wing Siu v R98 and R v Powell,99 it 
was advocated that the mental element necessary to establish secondary party (D2) 
liability is that “he foresaw the possibility that D1 might commit crime B”. If D2 
did foresee this possibility, his continued participation in crime A operated as an 
automatic authorisation of crime B. D2 was liable, “even if he did not intend to 
assist crime B at all”. The threshold was effectively lower for D2 than for D1, who 
would only be liable for crime B if he had the requisite mens rea for the offence.100 
The Supreme Court in Jogee advocated that “foresight is simply evidence (albeit 
sometimes strong evidence) of intent to assist or encourage, which is the proper 
mental element for establishing secondary liability”.101
An adventitious effect of the Supreme Court determination in Jogee102 is the 
adoption of a holistic template towards accessorial inculpation. The focal inquiry 
prospectively is whether the secondary party intentionally assisted or encouraged 
the commission of the crime by the perpetrator, knowing the facts necessary for its 
commission, and relationally intending to assist or encourage the principal offender 
to act with the relevant fault element.103 Diffi culties still remain, however, in terms 
of “joint enterprise” liability precepts and ostensible gang membership for later-day 
determination in the higher courts. As Sir Richard Buxton has recently intimated,104 
 96 See, for example, R v Fitzpatrick [1977] NI 20 (CA); R v Shepherd (1988) 86 Cr App R 47 (CA); Sharp 
[1987] QB 853 (CA); R v Ali (1995) 16 Cr App R (S) 692, CA; R v Baker [1999] 2 Cr App R 335; 
R v Hasan [2005] 2 AC 467.
 97 Jogee [2016] 2 WLR 681. The murder conviction was overturned by the Supreme Court, and Jogee 
was convicted of manslaughter at retrial; Lydia Willgress, “Man, 27, Convicted of Manslaughter after 
Having Joint Enterprise Murder Conviction Overturned” The Telegraph (5 September 2016), available 
at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/05/man-27-convicted-of-manslaughter-after-having-joint-
enterprise-m/ (visited 16 September 2016).
 98 [1985] 1 AC 168.
 99 [1999] 1 AC 1.
100 Jogee (n.97). 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid., [9], [10]. Cf the rejection of Jogee by the High Court of Australia on 24 August 2016 in Miller v 
The Queen [2016] HCA 30.
103 Ibid., [10].
104 Sir Richard Buxton, “Jogee: Upheaval in Secondary Liability for Murder” [2016] Crim LR 324.
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estimates suggest that up to 500 individuals are serving mandatory life sentences 
after trials in which the jury were directed in the terms adopted in Chan Wing Siu.105 
Despite the confi dent assertion of the Supreme Court in Jogee that notwithstanding 
wrongful directions to juries in such cases the defendant will not be able to appeal 
out of time, nor will the Criminal Cases Review Commission presumptively refer 
back to the Court of Appeal challenges that have already reached that adjudicative 
body, extant precepts suggest otherwise.106 The practical reality, in terms of pithy 
realism, is that intuitively it is much more likely that the appropriate and safest 
response will be to order a retrial.107
The likelihood of signifi cant number of retrials stands in conjunction with 
numerous substantive diffi culties that remain vis-à-vis secondary participation 
inculpation post — Jogee. These issues coalesce, as Horder cogently articulates,108 
around the nature of any tacit agreement requirement, the requisite knowledge of 
existing facts comportation to establish liability, and situations where the gang 
member neither agrees to nor anticipates that the perpetrator will act both with 
a purposive intent to kill and with a more dangerous weapon.109 There remains 
the untrammelled potentiality that, in certain undefi ned circumstances, the killing 
was caused by some “overwhelming supervening act” by D1 which nobody in 
D2’s shoes could have contemplated might happen and is of such a character as to 
relegate his acts to history. Constructive manslaughter rather than murder refl ects 
the culpability threshold standardisation in this scenario for the non-perpetrator but 
illegal venture gang member.110
In the context of defences, the criminal law has adopted a strict exclusionary 
approach to those who voluntarily associate with criminal gangs. For example, in 
both New Zealand and England and Wales, those who engage with gang members 
are unable to avail themselves of the defence of duress by threats due to their prior 
fault in associating with the gang.111 The principle established by the House of Lords 
in Hasan112 is that the excuse of duress by threats is not available to someone who 
has voluntarily put himself in a position in which he foresaw or ought reasonably to 
have foreseen the risk of being subjected to any compulsion by threats of violence.113 
More recently, in England and Wales, gang membership has been utilised to restrict 
105 Ibid., p.332.
106 Ibid.
107 See generally William Wilson and David Ormerod, “Simply Harsh to Fairly Simple: Joint Enterprise 
Reform” [2015] Crim LR 3 and Graeme Virgo, “Joint Enterprise Liability Is Dead: Long Live 
Accessorial Liability” [2012] Crim LR 850.
108 Jeremy Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 
pp.456–459.
109 Ibid., p.459.
110 Richard Card and Jill Molloy, Card, Cross and Jones: Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016) pp.764–765.
111 See cases referred to in note 96.
112 Hasan (n.96).
113 Ali (n.96), [12].
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the availability of the loss of control defence. In R v Gurpinar,114 the Court of 
Appeal suggested that a gang member would have diffi culty in satisfying the 
defence on the basis that a person of the defendant’s sex and age, with a normal 
degree of tolerance and self-restraint, and in the circumstances of the defendant, 
would not act in the same or a similar way. In cases where a defendant is convicted, 
gang membership operates as an aggravating feature for the purposes of sentencing 
irrespective of the nature of the relationship between the individual and the gang.115
Second, whilst it is sometimes diffi cult to distinguish between a traffi cker 
and a victim of human traffi cking, it may be even more diffi cult to distinguish 
between gang members by choice and ostensible gang members trapped by the 
gang. Potential victims may be reluctant to disclose details of traffi cking or gang 
membership for fear of punishment by the authorities, and/or traffi ckers/gang 
members.116 A traffi cker or gang member may become romantically involved 
with the victim, thereby adding to the diffi culty in distinguishing the traffi cker 
from the person being traffi cked.117 Not only is there likely to be political and 
legal reluctance to distinguish genuine from ostensible gang members for fear of 
appearing “soft on crime”, these distinctions would undoubtedly present signifi cant 
practical problems.
Notwithstanding the diffi culties identifi ed, it is appropriate that ostensible gang 
members are considered in light of the reform recommendations advanced, not least 
because as the Commission identifi ed, “gangs are environments that compound 
and exacerbate traditional assumptions about women’s roles and violence towards 
women”.118 Vulnerable individuals, particularly women and children who have been 
repeatedly failed by the system in devastating ways may seek refuge in a gang; for 
these individuals, the gang may offer “protection” from traumatic familial abuse.119 
The problem is that such protection comes at a high price, particularly for women, 
who may be subjected to psychological, sexual and violent abuse by members of 
the gang. There are three circumstances to consider: fi rst, the circumstances of 
individuals who are involved in intimate relationships with gang members and are 
being subjected to abuse within the relationship. The second type of circumstance 
includes the children of or those related to a gang member. The fi nal situation 
covers individuals who are not in an intimate relationship with a gang member but 
are being subjected to abuse by one or more gang members.
114 [2015] 1 WLR 3442.
115 R v Wihongi HC Napier CRI 2009-041-2096 [2010] NZHC 2034 (30 August 2010).
116 See, generally, UK Home Offi ce, “Victims of Modern Slavery” (18 March 2016), available at https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi le/450834/Victims_of_modern_
slavery_frontline_staff_guidance_v2_0_ext.pdf (visited 31 March 2016).
117 Ibid.
118 New Zealand Law Commission Issues Paper, Victims of Family Violence Who Commit Homicide 
(n.14) para.2.32.
119 Glennis Dennehy, “Troubled Journeys: An Analysis of Women’s Reality Experience within New Zealand 
Gangs” University of Canterbury (2000), available at http://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/handle/10092/5629 
(visited 14 December 2015).
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The reform recommendations advanced by the New Zealand Law Commission 
may assist individuals engaged in intimate or familial relationships with gang 
members, by raising awareness that the individual is, in fact a victim of familial 
violence and not a willing participant in the gang. As of this writing there is a 
demonstrable lack of awareness of the dynamics of familial abuse in gang-
related contexts. A pertinent example is the Wihongi case,120 in which, the Court 
of Appeal increased Jacqueline Wihongi’s sentence from eight to twelve years’ 
imprisonment on the basis that she represented a “high risk of reoffending” due 
to gang association.121 Jacqueline killed her abusive partner after he demanded sex 
during the course of an argument. Jacqueline had been threatened, prostituted and 
gang raped repeatedly by members of the Black Power gang. Once an individual 
becomes associated with a gang, dissociation from that gang can be very diffi cult. 
Gang members may demand money or force the individual to commit a crime. In 
other instances, the gang member may be punished before being allowed to leave 
the gang. In cases involving a victim of abuse, they may simply not be able to 
leave the gang because they are too frightened to do so, or alternatively because 
the predominant aggressor and other gang members will not allow it. The FVDRC 
states:
“violence and abuse against women and children within gang cultures is 
often more frequent and extreme. For a woman and her children living 
with a gang-affi liated man, their ability to leave the relationship is greatly 
curtailed. Fear of gang retaliatory violence and intimidation are very real 
barriers”.122
It is expected that the proposed reforms will assist victims of family violence in 
such contexts.
The review is less likely to assist those not in an “intimate relationship” with 
a gang member. It is common for intimate relationships to exist between gang 
members, but this is not always the case, and it is therefore important to ensure that 
any revisions to self-defence and/or the introduction of a new partial defence do not 
unjustifi ably exclude vulnerable categories of offender on the grounds that there is 
no familial link between the offender and their abuser. The exploitation suffered by 
women and children in gangs is often indistinguishable between those who have 
an intimate or familial link to a gang member and those who do not. In the rare 
case in which a victim of exploitation kills the perpetrator, it is inappropriate that 
the legal response should differ on the basis of the relationship between the victim 
120 Wihongi (n.115).
121 For further discussion see Nicola Wake, “Anglo-Antipodean Perspectives on the Positive Restriction 
Model and Abolition of the Provocation Defence” in Ben Livings, Alan Reed and Nicola Wake (eds), 
Mental Condition Defences and the Criminal Justice System: Perspectives from Law and Medicine 
(Newcastle-Upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015) pp.365–405.
122 FVDRC, Fourth Annual Report (n.2) p.85.
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and the perpetrator; all women and children, particularly girls, are vulnerable to 
exploitation within gangs.123 The arbitrary distinction implicit in the Commission’s 
reform recommendations is apt to cause injustice.
C. Th ird-party abuse 
A further category of cases in which the distinction between victims of family 
violence and other vulnerable offenders cannot be justifi ed is in the context of 
third-party abuse. The multi-faceted nature of third-party abuse, and the pernicious 
impact of sexual coercion, may be cogently identifi ed in alternative spheres of 
substantive criminal law.124
By way of extrapolation, a triumvirate of high-profi le determinations in the 
United States have invoked the parameters of rape by deception engaging abuse 
of authority and positions of trust by teachers, doctors, psychotherapists and the 
clergy.125 The cases share a common theme of abusive psychological entrapment: 
in Boro v Superior Court,126 the defendants told their respective victims that sexual 
intercourse was essential for effective medical treatment instead of a painful surgical 
alternative; in People v Cardenas,127 the defendant represented himself as a faith 
healer in the Curanderismo religion, and utilised a combination of abuse of trust, 
religious authority, psychological coercion, physical deprivation and elements of 
actual bodily force to coerce two women, one a minor, into multiple non-consensual 
sexual acts; and in Scadden v State,128 a high school teacher and girls’ volleyball 
coach in Wyoming “encouraged the victims to become dependent upon him in 
an atmosphere of trust, and …. he used his infl uence to impose his sexual will on 
those students”.129 The epicentre of the manipulative abuse is that the defendants 
use an authoritative position or manipulate a proven relationship to achieve sexual 
compliance, the corollary is that if the denuded and coerced individual subsequently 
reacts with fatal violence against the predatory “victim” coercer, even in a non-
directly immediate confrontation scenario, a reconceptualised partial self-defence 
template ought to be potentially applicable.
In England and Wales, the House of Lords recognised that the former provocation 
defence ought to be left to the jury where Camplin, a 15-year-old boy, killed Khan, 
123 Violence Against Women and Girls Strategy, “Exploitation of Girls by Gangs Fact Sheet” (2015–2018), 
available at https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKE
wi9-5zs-pLNAhUpDcAKHd_KAbwQFgggMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.royalgreenwich.gov.uk
%2Fdownload%2Fdownloads%2Fid%2F2927%2Fexploitation_of_girls_by_gangs_fact_sheet&usg=A
FQjCNEKYEJsz7htqe01WQdHA0zq0FvyrQ (visited 24 June 2016).
124 New Zealand Law Commission, Understanding Family Violence (n.4) para.7.35 discusses non-familial 
elder abuse.
125 Patricia J Falk, “Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion” (1998) 64 Brooklyn Law Review 44.
126 210 Cal Rptr 122 (Cal CA 1985).
127 21 Cal App 4th 927 (Cal CA 1994).
128 732 P 2d 1036 (Wyo 1987).
129 Ibid., 1039.
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a man in his fi fties, after he had “forcibly buggered” him “against his will”, and then 
laughed.130 It is unclear why reforms should assist an individual like Camplin only 
if Khan were a relative. Individuals who utilise violence in self-defence and/or to 
escape third-party abuse ought to receive the same criminal justice system response 
as those who react in the same or a similar way in response to intra-familial abuse. 
The mental state of the victim in these cases is broadly comparable, irrespective of 
whether that abuse emanates from an intimate partner/family member or a stranger/
third party, and for this reason reform recommendations should not be arbitrarily 
restricted on grounds of relationship status. Unfortunately this has not been the 
approach adopted by the New Zealand Law Commission.
The Howard League for Penal Reform have identifi ed another stratifi cation of 
third-party abuse of child offenders by offi cers within our prison system in England 
and Wales.131 In 2006 the Howard League published the fi ndings of an independent 
inquiry led by Lord Carlile into the use of restraint, strip-searching and solitary 
confi nement in penal institutions holding young offenders.132 This inquiry transpired 
against the backdrop of the tragic deaths of 14-year-old Adam Rickwood, who was 
found hanging in his cell after restraint by staff, and of 15-year-old Gareth Myatt, 
who died whilst being restrained by offi cers. The position, in certain respects, 
has arguably not signifi cantly improved during the intervening years since the 
publication of the Carlile inquiry: fi ve more boys have died in prison, and 4,350 
injuries have been sustained by children while being subject to restraint between 
2011 and 2015, and serious ongoing allegations remain against Medway Secure 
Training Centre involving child abuse, coercion and falsifi cation of records.133 The 
broader self-defence provisions outlined by the New Zealand Law Commission 
would not assist individuals like Adam and Gareth were they to kill an abuser in a 
bid to defend themselves.
The arbitrariness of the New Zealand Law Commission’s proposals is clearly 
illustrated through their potential application to the Wihongi case. It is worth 
reiterating that during the course of Jacqueline Wihongi’s life, she had been abused 
by intimate partners, gang members, and, at the age of 14, her drug and alcohol 
counsellor.134 The recommended reforms would not assist an individual like 
Jacqueline were she to kill her sexually abusive drug and alcohol counsellor but 
would assist were she to kill an abusive intimate partner. Not only is this distinction 
unjustifi able, it ignores prior recognition that individuals subject to third-party abuse 
ought to, in appropriate cases, have a (partial) defence available to them should 
they resort to killing their abuser. In truth, a more enlightened and communitarian 
set of reconceptualised self-defence proposals need to extend beyond familial 
130 Director of Public Prosecutions v Camplin [1978] AC 705 (HL).
131 The Howard League for Penal Reform, The Carlile Inquiry Ten Years on: The Use of Restraint, Solitary 
Confi nement and Strip-searching on Children (2016).
132 The Howard League for Penal Reform, The Carlile Inquiry (2006).
133 The Howard League for Penal Reform, The Carlile Inquiry Ten Years on (n.131).
134 Wihongi (n.115).
JICL-3(2)_3 Reconceptualising by Nicola Wake and Alan Reed.indd   23 15/10/16   5:22 PM
24 Journal of International and Comparative Law
violence standardisations to integrate other types of abuse of authoritative position 
and psychological coercive entrapment.
IV. Problems with the Law Commission’s Recommendations 
Every submission in response to the Law Commission’s Issues Paper agreed 
that self-defence is too restrictive, and out of line with other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions. Respondents differed, however, on the extent to which the solutions 
promulgated by the Commission ought to be restricted to victims of family 
violence. Half of the respondents were of the view that reform should be of general 
rather than specifi c application.135 The Commission conceded that there might be 
offenders in a comparable situation to victims of family violence, for example, 
those suffering “non-familial elder abuse”136 but resolved that the reform should 
be specifi c to “avoid the unintended consequence of violent offenders being able 
to take advantage of the change of law”.137 It is our contention that the unintended 
consequences associated with restrictive reforms cannot be justifi ed.
The main recommendation advanced by the Commission is the insertion of a 
new provision into the Crimes Act 1961 to ensure, where a person is responding to 
family violence, self-defence may apply even if that person is responding to a threat 
that is not imminent or uses force in excess of that involved in the harm or threatened 
harm. Note the limitation on the lower-threshold test to victims of family violence. 
The Commission recommended the Ministry of Justice consider whether the term 
“family violence” should be consistent with the defi nition provided in the Domestic 
Violence Act 1995 (violence against that person by any other person with whom 
that person is, or has been, in a domestic relationship138) in its current or amended 
form, but suggest that the defi nition ought to be inclusive rather than exhaustive 
for the purposes of revised self-defence.139 The 1995 Act states that the term 
“domestic relationship” includes relationships between spouses, partners, family 
members, others who are ordinarily members of the same household and close 
personal friends.140 “Violence” encompasses physical, sexual, and psychological 
abuse, including intimidation, harassment, threats and fi nancial or economic 
abuse.141 This substantive change is designed to be supplemented by amendments 
to the Evidence Act 2006 to allow admission of a broad range of family violence 
evidence to support self-defence claims.142 This approach was preferred to earlier 
135 New Zealand Law Commission, Understanding Family Violence (n.4).
136 Ibid., para.7.35.
137 Ibid., para.28.
138 Domestic Violence Act 1995 (NZ), s.3(1).
139 New Zealand Law Commission, Understanding Family Violence (n.4) R6.
140 Domestic Violence Act 1995 (NZ), s.3(2).
141 Ibid.
142 New Zealand Law Commission, Understanding Family Violence (n.4) R7.
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posited options which would have replaced “imminence” with the concept of 
“inevitability”143 or alternatively have introduced a bespoke self-defence provision 
for victims of family violence. Clarifi cation, as opposed to the introduction of new 
concepts, has the advantage of “minimising the risks of unintended consequences 
and introducing complexities of interpretation that could result in a further body of 
case law”.144
The problem is that whilst the advanced reforms may reduce the risk of 
unintended consequences, they do so only at the expense of excluding equally 
meritorious cases, and ultimately there is no guarantee that the proposed revisions 
to self-defence would only capture deserving cases. The reform recommendations 
highlight a recurring political approach to legislating for specifi c issues rather than 
identifying the benefi t of more general reform. There are three key problems with 
the proposed reforms. The fi rst practical problem relates to the proposed defi nitions 
of the terms “family violence” and “domestic relationship”. The second issue 
concerns the Commission’s insistence on confi ning the reform recommendations 
to a specifi c category of individual; the problems with this approach are articulated 
via a review of self-defence in householder cases in England and Wales. The fi nal 
issue pertains to the justifi catory basis of self-defence, and the extent to which 
the proposed reforms diverge from this theoretical underpinning. There has been 
public outcry in response to the operation of self-defence in family violence cases 
in Victoria on grounds that certain offenders ought not to have been able to claim 
the defence.
A. Relationship status 
The terms “family violence” and “domestic relationship” are defi ned, as noted, in 
wide terms in order that a broad cohort of individuals and situations may be brought 
within the test. Importantly, the legislation applies not only to current partnerships, 
but also to ex-partners thereby avoiding the inherent diffi culty in assessing when/
whether a relationship came to an end. This criticism has been levelled at s.76 of 
143 It is questionable whether the defence ought to be available where the threat is inevitable. The term 
itself is inherently vague; it is not clear how remote a threat will have to be before it is considered too 
remote; or what factors might be taken into account in assessing whether there is a threat. It may blur 
the distinction between killings in self-defence and revenge killings, given the diffi culty the court is 
likely to encounter in separating such motivations, particularly where there may be a retaliatory element 
in cases involving abuse. As the Commission concedes, it blurs the justifi catory basis for the defence: 
New Zealand Law Commission Issues Paper, Victims of Family Violence Who Commit Homicide 
(n.14) para.7.13. The term could be interpreted too widely. For example, the defence may be open to 
prison inmates who are of the view that an attack or another attack was inevitable: Vincent (CA) (n.49); 
Vincent (SC) (n.49). Those of a paranoid disposition, who are unable to conceive of alternative options, 
might readily invoke it. Gang members could allege that an attack by another gang was inevitable: New 
Zealand Law Commission Issues Paper, Victims of Family Violence Who Commit Homicide (n.14) 
para.7.11
144 New Zealand Law Commission Issues Paper, Victims of Family Violence Who Commit Homicide 
(n.14) para.7.
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the Serious Crimes Act 2015 (England and Wales) which created the offence of 
“controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship”. A person 
(A) commits an offence if he repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour 
towards another person (B) that is controlling or coercive.145 The offence applies 
only where A and B are personally connected,146 the behaviour has a serious effect 
on B147 and A knows or ought to know this to be the case.148 An intimate personal 
relationship must exist between A and B, and will only do so where A and B live 
together and they are members of the same family, or have previously been in 
an intimate personal relationship with each other.149 The offence may apply to 
former partners who live with the victim but can never apply to a former partner 
who no longer resides with the victim. Where coercive and controlling behaviour 
occurs in the latter type of scenario, the statutory framework guidance provides that 
harassment and/or stalking legislation ought to apply.150 As Bettinson suggests, this 
does not refl ect the true reality of relationship breakdowns where an end point may 
be diffi cult to identify.151
As noted, the proposed defi nition in New Zealand is broader, and in the absence 
of a familial link and/or where the perpetrator is not living with the victim of abuse, 
it may be possible to establish that a close personal friendship existed between the 
parties for the purposes of the proposed reform.152 In the absence of a domestic 
relationship, the relationships between landlord and tenant, employer and worker, 
and employees within the same business are excluded from the defi nition in New 
Zealand. This implies that more formal relationship constructs, for example, student/
teacher, counsellor/patient relationships will also be excluded. The law recognises, 
however, that protection is mandated in cases outside domestic relationships. 
The expectation is that, whilst the Domestic Violence Act 1995 (NZ) provisions 
allow protection orders to be implemented in the context of intra-familial abuse, 
restraining orders may be implemented under the Harassment Act 1997 (NZ) in 
response to, inter alia, harassment that is intended to cause individuals to fear for 
their safety or the safety of their family in extra-familial cases. The implementation 
of a designated offence combatting such behaviour supports the argument that 
similar protections ought to be available to vulnerable offenders within and outside 
145 Serious Crimes Act 2015 (UK), s.76(1).
146 Ibid., s.76(2).
147 Ibid., s.76(1)(c).
148 Ibid., s.76(1)(d).
149 Ibid., s.76(2).
150 Home Offi ce, Controlling or Coercive Behaviour in an Intimate or Family Relationship: Statutory 
Guidance Framework (December 2015). For further discussion see, Vanessa Bettinson and Charlotte 
Bishop, “Is the Creation of a Discrete Offence of Coercive Control Necessary to Combat Domestic 
Violence?” (2015) 66(2) The Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 179–197.
151 Vanessa Bettinson, Criminalising Coercive and Controlling Behaviour in Domestic Violence Cases: 
Achievable or a Mere Aspiration? (Northumbria Centre for Evidence and Criminal Justice Studies, 
2016).
152 Domestic Violence Act 1995 (NZ), s.3 (2).
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of the familial context. As identifi ed the position is mirrored in England and Wales 
where stalking and harassment legislation is designed to protect extra-familial 
victims. The rationale for distinguishing offences based upon relationship status 
as opposed to the conduct of the offender is unclear; presumably these offences 
could be reviewed and re-enacted to cover intra- and extra-familial coercive 
and controlling behaviour rather than the current position which unsatisfactorily 
requires prosecutors to navigate diverse offences predicated on relationship status 
rather than individual culpability.
Importantly, recognition that this form of conduct occurs and is criminalised in 
intra- and extra-familial cases demonstrates the need to protect victims of family 
abuse irrespective of their relationship status. It is unclear why an individual 
defending themselves or attempting to evade such criminal behaviour should 
be held to a different standard of accountability by virtue of their relationship 
with the perpetrator. The fundamental problem with the recommended reform is 
the insistence on adopting a defi nition that attempts to capture several forms of 
personal relationship, at the unjustifi ed expense of other relationships that may also 
be open to abuse. The focus in these cases should be upon the situation, the actions 
of the parties, and the emotions experienced, as opposed to relationship status. The 
Commission’s proposed reform to self-defence is arguably worse than the position 
regarding the offences outlined in this section, since only intra-familial abuse is 
relevant to the former, but intra- and extra-familial abuse is recognised by the latter.
B. When the home is both a castle and a cage: 
self-defence in England and Wales 
In assessing criminal responsibility, where two individuals respond in a similar way 
to a particular set of circumstances, the question should concern culpability rather 
than the class or category that individual belongs to. The true arbitrariness of the 
proposed reforms may be viewed through a critical elucidation of the householder 
provisions in England and Wales, and the equivalent family violence in self-defence 
legislation operating in Victoria.
Self-defence in England and Wales arises under common law, as clarifi ed by 
s.76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, and s.3(1) of the Criminal 
Law Act 1967 (use of force in the prevention of crime or making arrest). The test for 
self-defence requires that the degree of force used by the defendant was reasonable 
in the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.153 The defendant may 
rely on a genuine mistaken belief in the need for self-defence,154 and there is no 
need “to weigh to a nicety the exact measure of any necessary action”.155 A failure 
153 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (UK), s.76(3). See also, Palmer v R [1971] AC 814; 
R v McInnes [1971] 1 WLR 1600.
154 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s.76(4). See also, R v Williams (1984) 78 Cr App R 276; 
R v Oatridge (1992) 94 Cr App R 367.
155 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s.76 (7).
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to retreat is a factor to be considered rather than establishing a duty to retreat 
when assessing whether force was reasonable in the circumstances.156 The defence 
is less restrictive than the approach operating in New Zealand where imminence 
and a lack of alternative options remain essential elements of the defence, albeit 
judicially constructed.
Despite the less restrictive nature of self-defence in England and Wales, a “new 
category of self-defence”157 was introduced in 2013 in order to accommodate the 
“unique” circumstances of householders acting in defence of themselves or another. 
New s.5A established that:
“In a householder case, the degree of force used by D is not to be regarded 
as having been reasonable in the circumstances as D believed them to be if 
it was grossly disproportionate in those circumstances”.158
In a case other than a householder case, “the degree of force used by D is not to be 
regarded as having been reasonable in the circumstances as D believed them to be 
if it was disproportionate in those circumstances”.159 De Than and Elvin identify 
that it is “hard to understand the rationale behind the grossly disproportionate 
test”,160 and whether the amendments represent the substantive reform which upon 
fi rst blush it might appear is also doubted.161 Nevertheless, focus upon a discrete 
category of offender is of concern to members of both the legal profession and legal 
academics.
The fi rst appellate court case involving the householder provisions was made 
on behalf of Collins (a burglar) who sustained injuries from which he is not expected 
to recover, as a result of being restrained in a headlock by the homeowner.162 The 
claimant submitted two grounds under Judicial Review Proceedings, namely: a 
declaration that s.76(5A) is incompatible with art.2 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights; and that the Crown Prosecution Service had erred in their decision 
not to prosecute the homeowner. The Court of Appeal found no breach of art.2, 
noting that s.76(5A) was compatible with the Claimant’s right to life.163 Three key 
156 Ibid., s.76(6A) as inserted by s.148 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. 
157 Mark P Thomas, “Defenceless Castles: The Use of Grossly Disproportionate Force by Householders in 
Light of Collins” (2016) 80(6) Journal of Criminal Law (December, forthcoming). 
158 Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 as amended by s.43(1)(5) of the Crime and 
Courts Act 2013.
159 Section 76(5A) and 76(6) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 as amended by s.43 of the 
Crime and Courts Act 2013 [author’s emphasis added].
160 Claire De Than and Jesse Elvin, “Mistaken Private Defence: The Case for Reform” in Alan Reed, 
Michael Bohlander, Nicola Wake and Emma Smith (eds), General Defences in Criminal Law: Domestic 
and Comparative Perspectives (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2015) p.138.
161 Ibid.
162 In the early hours, Collins had entered the home of B, whereupon he was restrained by means of a 
headlock. As a consequence, Collins suffered serious personal injury from which he is not expected to 
recover: R (Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] 2 WLR 1303, [2].
163 Ibid., [32] (Sir Brian Leveson).
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issues arose in the case which are worth highlighting as similar diffi culties are 
likely to arise in relation to the recommended reforms in New Zealand. The fi rst 
problem is the elevation of a particular category of individual above all others in 
terms of the level of legal protection provided. The introduction of the “grossly 
disproportionate” test was “designed to give householders greater latitude in 
terrifying or extreme situations where they may not be thinking clearly about the 
precise level of force that is necessary to deal with the threat faced”.164 Thomas 
advocates that “it makes sense that householders have that extra margin of 
appreciation in defending themselves”.165 Judge CJ, in R v Saw166 identifi ed that 
“there is a longstanding, almost intuitive, belief that our homes should be our 
castles. The concept suggests impregnability and defi ance against intrusion”.
Yet there is no logical explanation for failing to extend the same protection 
to victims of family violence and/or other vulnerable categories of offender who 
fear for their safety or the safety of loved ones. The material difference in the 
former case, in particular, is that the perpetrator is known to the victim; it is simply 
unacceptable that the legislation imports a lower or higher threshold test based 
upon a (lack of) personal nexus between the victim and the perpetrator. Brooks has 
suggested that being attacked by a family member might even be regarded “worse” 
than a domestic burglary on account of “the particular relational connection 
between offenders and victims. This connection is forged through shared intimacy, 
familial bonds [and/] or a shared householder”.167 The aggressor is known, a person 
placed in a position of trust, not a trespasser or a stranger. The breach of trust, 
Brooks argues, might render the second case worse than the fi rst.168 The fact that the 
victim of family violence is unable (actually or based upon his/her understanding 
of the situation) to escape the torment of the live-in aggressor might support that 
view. The simple fact, however, is that where an individual fears (serious) violence, 
they ought to be able to protect themselves, and the test for self-defence ought not 
to vary depending upon whether the attack occurred inside or outside of the home 
and/or whether there was a personal nexus between the victim and the perpetrator. 
The current position in England and Wales which treats the home as a castle 
and the safest “place of refuge”169 in householder cases, but as a cage where the 
victim defends him/herself against an intimate partner or family member is simply 
unacceptable. The New Zealand Law Commission’s reforms are likely to give rise 
to similar anomalies in cases involving extra-familial vulnerable offenders.
The second issue concerns the extent to which the householder provisions 
have substantively changed the law. Sir Brian Leveson expressed that the change 
164 Ministry of Justice, Circular No 213/02, para.11.
165 Thomas, “Defenceless Castles” (n.157).
166 [2009] 2 Cr App R (S) 54, [6].
167 Thom Brooks, Punishment (New York and London: Routledge, 2012) p.190.
168 Ibid.
169 Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: Concerning High Treason, and 
Other Pleas of the Crown and Criminal Causes (Bell-Yard, near Temple-Bar: E and R Brooke, 1628) p.83.
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represents “no more than a refi nement to the common law on self-defence”.170 
Endorsing the explanation provided in Blackstone, the Secretary of State for 
Justice, explained:
“The new provision merely affects the interpretation of ‘(un)reasonable in 
the circumstances’ so that force is not by law automatically unreasonable 
in householder cases simply because it is disproportionate provided it is 
not grossly disproportionate”.171
The rationale is to provide a “discretionary area of judgment in householder cases, 
with a different emphasis to that which applies in other cases”.172 The amendment 
does not provide “a carte blanche” to householders in the degree of force they 
use against trespassers.173 The example provided by the court is that a failure to 
retreat may be disproportionate but still reasonable in a householder case although 
in other cases, it would remain unreasonable;174 what is reasonable “for a bouncer 
whose job it is to restrain those who create disturbance in a public setting will 
not necessarily be the same for a householder who does not have that expertise, 
imputed knowledge or experience…”.175 The same argument could be made in 
the majority of cases as most individuals are not specially trained in self-defence. 
Further, if the force used is reasonable, arguably it is the context that makes it so, 
rendering the force used proportionate according to the circumstances; the emphasis 
on proportionate/disproportionate/grossly disproportionate force blurs the issue, 
when the assessment ought to focus upon the impact the circumstances have on 
the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions. Given the restrictive interpretation 
of self-defence in New Zealand, it is clear that the Commission’s recommendations 
are designed to make a substantive change to the law. Nevertheless, the extent of 
that change and any sound policy for limiting the defence to a specifi c category of 
offender remain unclear.
The third issue identifi ed is that a defendant cannot rely on “any mistaken 
belief attributable to intoxication that is voluntarily induced”.176 Sir Brian Leveson 
implied that the householder provision might be justifi ed on the predicate that the 
common law approach to intoxication is “unduly restrictive for householders”.177 
This issue would not arise in New Zealand where intoxication may be invoked 
as an evidentiary strategy to negate mens rea and thereby remains relevant to 
170 Collins (n.162), [34].
171 David Ormerod and David Perry, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016), para.A3.63 cited in Collins, ibid.
172 Ibid., [23].
173 Ibid., [61].
174 Ibid., [24].
175 Ibid., [29].
176 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s.76(5). See also, R v O’Grady [1987] QB 995.
177 Collins (n.162), [30].
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subjective elements of criminal law defences.178 Nevertheless, a critical exposition 
of this rationale demonstrates how diffi cult it is to justify restricting defences to 
specifi c categories of offender. The extrapolation is that there is much to support 
the proposition that those who are intoxicated in public must take responsibility 
for their level of intoxication,179 but the rationale falls away when an individual 
consumes alcohol in his/her own home in the absence of anticipation of any 
interaction with a trespasser.180 The position elucidated in O’Grady,181 R v 
O’Connor182 and R v Hatton183 that “where the jury are satisfi ed that the defendant 
was mistaken in his belief that any force or the force that he in fact used was 
necessary to defend himself and are further satisfi ed that the mistake was caused 
by voluntary intoxication, the defence must fail”,184 was codifi ed by s.76(5) of the 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. This uncompromising position applies 
irrespective of specifi c/basic intent offence delineation. On a murder charge, 
intoxication evidence is relevant to the mens rea assessment, but not the defendant’s 
subjective belief of the circumstances for the purposes of self-defence. Sir Brian 
Leveson’s suggestion that amending the reasonableness requirement compensates 
for the unavailability of the defence in cases involving intoxicated mistaken belief 
is odd. The amendments do not alter the position, and his assertion ignores the fact 
that the issue runs much deeper than self-defence, and it impacts on the signifi cant 
majority of intoxicated offenders, not just householders. New Zealand, by contrast, 
rejects the controversial specifi c/basic intent bifurcation operating in Anglo-
American jurisdictions, advocating that it is “not only inappropriate but it obscures 
more than it reveals”.185 The New Zealand approach more appropriately utilises 
voluntary intoxication as an evidentiary strategy to demonstrate lack of mens rea 
across the spectrum of offences.186 The issue in England and Wales is not resolved 
by ad hoc and incoherent amendments to self-defence, but rather Parliamentary 
intervention in terms of rejecting constructive mens rea in the context of voluntary 
intoxication and basic intent offences, and the implementation of a bespoke 
offence predicated on dangerous intoxication.187 The problems associated with 
intoxication doctrine in England and Wales cannot be usefully invoked to support 
the householder provisions.
178 R v Kamipeli [1975] 2 NZLR 610; Steinberg v Police (1983) 1 CRNZ 129; R v Storer CA368/05 
(2 May 2006), [26].
179 See generally, Director of Public Prosecutions v Majewski [1977] AC 443 and Andrew Simester, 
“Intoxication is Never a Defence” [2009] Crim LR 3, 5.
180 Collins (n.162), [30].
181 O’Grady (n.176).
182 [1991] Crim LR 135.
183 [2006] 1 Cr App R 16.
184 O’Grady (n.176), 999 (Lord Lane CJ).
185 O’Connor (n.182), [53] (Barwick CJ).
186 Kamipeli (n.178).
187 For further discussion see, Alan Reed and Nicola Wake, “Potentiate Liability and Preventing Fault 
Attribution: The Intoxicated ‘Offender’ and Anglo-American Dépecage Standardisations” (2013) 
47 John Marshall Law Review 57.
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C. Justifying self-defence: the experience in Victoria 
The amendments proposed by the New Zealand Law Commission are based 
upon s.322M (formerly s.9AH) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Victoria).188 Section 
322M specifi es that, in cases involving family violence, self-defence may apply 
even where the threat was not imminent and the force was excessive.189 The 
provision is “enlivened in circumstances where family violence is alleged”.190 
Despite overwhelming support for the revised provisions in Victoria, their use 
in Bracken resulted in public outcry. Bracken was acquitted of the murder of 
his de facto partner, Curtis, on grounds of self-defence. Curtis had driven to 
Bracken’s father Michael’s house with a gun in her car, and during the course 
of an argument she threatened to kill him. Bracken arrived soon after and, 
believing Curtis was going to shoot his father, retrieved the gun from the car. 
Curtis advanced towards Bracken, and CCTV footage showed Bracken push her 
to the ground before shooting her twice in the head, twice in the abdomen and 
then in the wrist.
The defence argued that Bracken was “broken by the abuse”, and it was, in 
a terrifying moment, a necessary act to protect Bracken and his father. Forensic 
psychiatrist Associate Professor Dr Carolyn Quadrio, told the jury that Bracken 
had been subjected to the most severe category of family violence, “intimate 
terrorism”.191 There was evidence that Bracken had been subjected to regular 
beatings over the course of the relationship, which had been witnessed by 
friends on various occasions. Bracken’s colleague recalled seeing a gash on 
his face; Bracken allegedly explained, “she wants to stab me in my sleep”.192 
Defence counsel argued that identifying the “tragedy of the situation” serves to 
recognise:
“the reality of the black eyes and the bruises, and the split lips, and the 
screaming, the kicking while he’s on the fl oor with shattered blood and 
glass. It recognises the illness, the rages, the control. It also recognises that 
he loved her and he didn’t want her dead”.193
188 As amended by Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic).
189 This effectively re-enacted and expanded the scope of s.9AH of the Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (Vic) 
beyond homicide cases.
190 R v Bracken [2014] VSC 94, [10].
191 Mark Russell, “Family Violence Claim ‘a Nonsense’ in the Phillip Bracken Case” The Age (21 February 
2014), available at http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/family-violence-claim-a-nonsense-in-phillip-
bracken-case-20140221-3362l.html (visited 27 June 2016).
192 Shelley Hadfi eld and Kathryn Powley, “Jury Lets Phillip Bracken Walk Free after Trial over Death of 
Defacto Helen Curtis” Herald Sun (8 March 2014), available at http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/
law-order/jury-lets-phillip-bracken-walk-free-after-trial-over-death-of-defacto-helen-curtis/story-
fni0fee2-1226849204563 (visited 27 June 2016).
193 Mark Russell, “Forklift Driver Found Not Guilty of Murdering Defacto” The Age (28 February 2014), 
available at http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/forklift-driver-found-not-guilty-of-murdering-defacto-
20140228-33qpe.html#ixzz4ClgMjJFh (visited 27 June 2016).
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Based on this account, it would appear that this is the category of case s.322M, and 
the posited option for amendment in New Zealand, is designed to accommodate.
The Crown argued, however, that the account provided was “blacker than 
necessarily the reality”.194 The defence gave notice, in the form of defence overview, 
of an intention to adduce tendency evidence from prosecution witnesses;195 namely 
that Curtis had a tendency towards losing her temper, becoming angry, and/or being 
in an uncontrollable rage, rendering it more probable that she was a perpetrator of 
family violence, and that she had acted in the way described by Bracken and his father 
on the day of the killing.196 The defence also sought advanced ruling as to whether 
in adducing evidence of the defendant’s good character,197 the prosecution would 
be permitted to adduce evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions.198 Insofar as 
the evidence of good character related to the nature of the relationship, and not the 
offence charged, the prosecution would not be permitted to adduce such evidence.199 
That Bracken was in possession of a long-arm weapon in the period proximate to the 
shooting might demonstrate a disposition different to that advanced by the defence, 
but whether the Crown was able to adduce such evidence would depend on how 
the good character evidence unfolded during trial.200 In an indictment of the revised 
defence, MP Phil Cleary said, “I’m sick of watching poor, dead women being vilifi ed 
in the courtroom. It’s devastating for the family. No civilised society could say that 
she did anything to deserve the level of violence infl icted on her”.201
It is our contention that while the public outcry pertained to victim blaming 
and potential abuse of self-defence where family violence is alleged, concerns 
regarding s.322M run deeper and tie to the justifi catory nature of self-defence. 
A fundamental question is whether justifi catory self-defence ought to be made 
available where the threat was not imminent and the force used is excessive. There 
is a “temptation” to “say that a non-confrontational [sic] ‘self-defence’ homicide 
is morally justifi able”,202 particularly in cases like Wang. In non-confrontational 
homicides involving domestic abuse, it might be argued that the predominant 
aggressor’s violent conduct operates to forfeit the right to life or that the violation 
of the primary victim’s autonomy justifi es the primary victim’s response.203 As 
Dressler puts it, the proposition that a primary victim is “justifi ed in killing her 
abuser [in non-confrontational circumstances], although well meaning, is wrong, 
194 Russell, “Family Violence Claim ‘a Nonsense’ in the Phillip Bracken Case” (n.191).
195 Bracken (n.190), [17]. See also, Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), s.97.
196 Bracken (n.190), [18].
197 Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), s.110.
198 Bracken (n.190), [31]. See also, Evidence Act 2008, ss.135 and 137.
199 Bracken (n.190), [42].
200 Ibid., [61]–[66].
201 Hadfi eld and Powley, “Jury Lets Phillip Bracken Walk Free after Trial over Death of Defacto Helen 
Curtis” (n.192).
202 Joshua Dressler, “Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Refl ections” [2006] Ohio State Journal 
of Criminal Law 3, 463.
203 Ibid.
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and…any serious effort to expand self-defence law — for [primary victims] 
but also presumably, for others — to permit such killings is a ‘reform’ society 
ultimately will regret”. In order for self-defence to operate, the use of defensive 
force must be justifi ed. Though it may be tempting to allow complete self-defence 
in some cases where the threat is not imminent and the force is excessive, this 
ought to be resisted since these circumstances may be more closely aligned with 
imperfect self-defence, similar to that adopted in a number of US jurisdictions.
V. Comparative American Standardisations: 
The Imperfect Self-Defence Doctrine 
The judgement on the appropriateness of self defence in US jurisprudence often 
engages an holistic evaluation of risk thresholds appurtenant to psychological 
coercive entrapment.204 The theoretical risk standardisation correlates to arguments 
advanced herein that it is the individual coercer, who creates the entrapment and 
conseqeuential fear, who bears part of the societal risk burden.205 There is a parallel 
syllogism with perspectives advanced by Bergelson206 that, when addressing the 
liability of the defendant coercee for intentional killing, courts should factorise 
within the criminal liability equipoise whether the “victim” was in any way culpable 
for D’s conduct.207 This perspective is framed in terms of conditionality of rights:208 
“a victim may lose (or lessen) his right not to be harmed because of his own 
conduct”.209 If that happens the defendant ought not to be held criminally accountable 
or his punishment should be reduced.210 The jurors, as moral arbiters within the 
reasonable/excessive force self-defence morality play, should be instructed in this 
comparative culpability defence when imposing culpability thresholds.211
Further grist to the mill sits within Ferzan’s articulation that there is a “moral 
symmetry” between the aggressor and the defendant.212 In this reconceptualisation 
204 See, generally, Mitchell N Berman, “The Normative Function of Coercion Claims” (2008) 8 Legal 
Theory 45; Richard A Rosen, “On Self-Defence, Imminence and Women Who Kill Their Batterers” 
(1993) 71 North Carolina Law Review 371; and Claire O Finkelstein, “Self-Defence as a Rational 
Excuse” (1996) 57 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 621.
205 See Monu Bedi, “Excusing Behaviour: Reclassifying the Federal Common Law Defences of Duress and 
Necessity Relying on the Victim’s Role” (2011) 101 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 575.
206 Vera Bergelson, Victims’ Rights and Victims’ Wrongs: Comparative Liability in Criminal Law in Markus 
D Dubber (ed) (California, USA: Stanford University Press, 2009).
207 Ibid., pp.1–5.
208 Ibid., pp.61–62, 161–163.
209 Ibid., pp.89–90.
210 Ibid.
211 See, George P Fletcher, “The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution” (1999) 3 Buffalo Criminal 
Law Review 51. Interestingly, Bergelson ultimately advocates for an affi rmative defence of comparative 
liability that defendants can utilise for culpability mitigation: Bergelson, Victims’ Rights And Victims’ 
Wrongs (n.206).
212 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defence” (2005) Law and Philosophy 711, 734.
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the aggressor is an actor who has volitionally and intentionally created a risk of 
harm, and it is incumbent upon the coercee to confront that risk.213 The answer is 
to remove the veneer and get to the substance of the norms, whereby it may be just 
to allow the defendant to redistribute risk (or part of the risk) back to the aggressor. 
Viewed in such a legal prism, risk is demarcated as an epistemic concept with 
redistribution amongst “unlawful” participants:214 “It is the aggressor’s culpable 
creation of the risk that gives rise to the defender’s prescriptive rights”.215
The epistemic conceptualisation of risk that Ferzan cogently advances stands 
in tandem with Robinson’s theory of self-defence as an embodiment of moral 
forfeiture.216 Self-defence is classifi ed as a justifi cation defence in that via their 
initial acts of aggression the ultimate victim forfeits a panoply of rights that 
otherwise would have existed.217 The umbrella of “lost” rights may encompass 
rights to bodily integrity, right to freedom from aggression, or even interest in life 
within defi ned spheres.218
The basic substantive contours of self-defence have developed under US 
precepts in more limited circumstances.219 The venerable formulation of common 
law is that an individual actor may defend herself with deadly force only when she 
believes such force is necessary to defend against an imminent (or in a number of 
jurisdictions an “immediate”) unlawful threat of death or serious bodily harm.220 
The defence is emasculated as an “all or nothing” reduction in culpability for 
213 Ibid., and see also Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Self-Defense and the State” (2008) 5 Ohio State Journal 
of Criminal Law 449.
214 Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defence” (n.212) 740.
215 Ibid., and see also, Jeff McMahan, “Self-Defense and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker” (1994) 104 
Ethics 252–290, articulating an eclectic theory that justifi es self-defence against an innocent attacker on 
the predicate that he poses an objectively unjustifi ed threat.
216 Paul H Robinson, “Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis” (1982) 82 Columbia Law Review 
199, 214.
217 Ibid., pp.214–216.
218 See, generally, Paul H Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses (West Publishing Co: Minnesota, USA, 1984) 
s.131(c )(1) where he also rejects the traditional assumption that only imminent harm requires a response, 
and asserts that if the necessity requirement is applied appropriately, no abuse of the justifi cation defence 
will occur, even if the danger to the victim is not imminent:
“If the concern of the limitation is to exclude threats of harm that are too remote to require a 
response, the problem is adequately handled by requiring simply that the response be ‘necessary’. 
The proper inquiry is not the immediacy of the threat but the immediacy of the response necessary 
in defence. If a threatened harm is such that it cannot be avoided if the intended victim waits until 
the last moment, the principle of self-defence must permit him to act earlier-as early as is required 
to defend himself effectively”.
219 See Dressler, “Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers” (n.202); Sanford H Kadish, “Respect for Life and 
Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law” (1976) 64 California Law Review 871; and Jeremy Waldron, 
“Self-Defense: Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Accounts” (2000) 88 California Law Review 711.
220 Luis E Chiesa, “United States of America” in Reed, Bohlander, Wake and Smith, General Defences in 
Criminal Law (n.160) pp.329, 333–336.
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murder,221 as also applicable within the criminal codes in France222 and Germany,223 
and the force utilised must be proportionate to threatened harm to allow application. 
A fear of present or future violence from the initial aggressor has generally not been 
suffi cient for activation of even a partial defence to liability, except in rare cases of 
“imperfect” self-defence, as articulated below.224 The belief in an unlawful threat of 
death or serious bodily harm must be both subjectively reasonable in that the actor 
herself truly believes it, and normatively reasonable in that the objective reasonable 
person would similarly so believe.225 This latter criterion mirrors the doctrinal 
change that occurred in Canada in 2012,226 whereby Parliament replaced the self-
defence provisions in the criminal code that had received vituperative criticism for 
their enduring complexity with a more straightforward standardisation, albeit less 
predictable in overall outcome. The key issue is whether the act of self-defence was 
“reasonable” in light of a non-exhaustive list of factors set out in the code for jury 
evaluation. Section 34(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code provides that the court 
shall consider the relevant circumstances of the person, the other parties and the 
act, including, but not limited to nine specifi ed factors:
(1) the nature of the force or threat;
(2) the extent to which the use of force was imminent and whether there were other 
means available to respond to the potential use of force;
(3) the person’s role in the incident;
(4) whether any party to the incident used or threatened to use a weapon;
(5) the size, age, gender and physical capabilities of the parties to the incident, 
including any prior use or threat of force and the nature of that force or threat;
(6) the nature, duration and history of any relationship between the parties to the 
incident, including any prior use or threat of force and the nature of that force 
or threat;
221 Ibid.
222 Article 122.5 of the French Criminal Code lays down the ambit of self-defence, called “legitimate 
defence”:
“A person who, faced with an unjustifi ed attack against himself or another, carries out at that time an 
act required by the necessity of the legitimate defence of himself or another is not criminally liable, 
except it there is a disproportion between the means of defence used and the gravity of the attack”.
223 The right to self-defence is codifi ed in s.32 StGB of the German Criminal Code:
(1) “A person who commits an act in self-defence does not act unlawfully;
(2)  self-defence means any defensive action that is necessary to avert an imminent unlawful attack 
on oneself or another”.
 See, generally, Michael Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009).
224 See, for example, Swann v United States 548 A 2d 928, 930, 931 (DC 1994).
225 Cathryn Jo Rosen, “The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered 
Women Who Kill” (1986) 36 The American University Law Review 11, 27–33.
226 Kent Roach, “Canada” in Reed, Bohlander, Wake and Smith, General Defences in Criminal Law (n.160) 
pp.201–205.
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(7) any history of interaction or communication between the parties to the incident;
(8) the nature and proportionality of the person’s response to the use or threat of 
force; and
(9) whether the act committed was in response to a use or threat of force that the 
person knew was lawful.227
The antediluvian lineage of federal US self-defence doctrine attaches to early 
Supreme Court precepts. In Andersen v United States,228 by way of illustration, 
a precedential “authority” that concerned a sailor who killed the fi rst mate, but 
sought reliance on retaliatory lethal force, it was determined that self-defence was 
transcendent: the defendant, “was acting under a reasonable belief that he was in 
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm by the deceased and that his act in 
causing death was necessary in order to avoid [this harm] which was apparently 
imminent”.229 The fundamental elements and parameters of self-defence doctrine 
have not changed over the years, and federal courts have adopted the defence 
where a defendant’s use of force was reasonable, proportionate and necessary to 
defend against imminent serious bodily harm.230 A standardised defi nition has been 
provided by the Ninth Circuit within the following contours:
“In order to make a prima facie case of self-defence, a defendant must 
make an offer of proof as elements: (1) a reasonable belief that the use of 
force was necessary to defend himself or another against the immediate 
use of unlawful force and (2) the use of no more force than was reasonable 
in the circumstances”.231
Interestingly, a more expansive self-defence doctrine, beyond the “immediacy” 
constraints of federal common law, has been recommended by the American Law 
Institute in its Model Penal Code and enacted in some states.232 Section 3.04 of the 
227 Ibid., p.203.
228 170 US 481 (1898).
229 Ibid.
230 See generally, Stephen S Schwartz, “Is There a Common Law Necessity Defense in Federal Criminal 
Law” (2008) 75 University of Chicago Law Review 1259.
231 United States v Biggs 441 F 3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir 2006) (In defi ning one’s self against an unlawful 
attack, a person is only justifi ed in using such an account of force as may appear to him at the time 
necessary to accomplish that purpose).
232 Note that a rare exception where self-defence was transcendental in a non-confrontational scenario was 
State v Leidholm 334 NW 2d 811 (ND 1982). The abusively coerced wife killed the sleeping coercee. 
The court, in facilitating a self-defence claim, adopted a subjectifi ed personifi cation of the reasonable 
person individuation:
“[A] correct statement of the law of self-defense is one in which the court directs the jury to assume 
the physical and psychological properties peculiar to the accused, viz., the place itself as best it can 
in the shoes of the accused, and then decide whether or not the peculiar circumstances surrounding 
the accused at the time he used force were suffi cient to crate in his mind a sincere and reasonable 
belief that the use of force was necessary to protect himself from imminent and unlawful harm”.
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code justifi es the use of self-preventative force, including deadly force, subject to 
certain limitations, when the actor believes (and such a belief is reasonable) that the 
force used is “immediately necessary” on the present occasion. The code simply 
asks whether the necessity to use the defensive force is immediately at hand, rather 
than the spatial temporal limitation that applies at common law which delimits a 
relational time span between the contours of the defendant’s use of defensive force 
and the threatened act of aggression being counteracted.233
The imminence/immediately necessary standardisations to justify lethal force 
has proved controversial in the US for outcomes reached in cases involving battered 
women.234 The paradigmatic scenario engages pre-emptive rather than retaliatory 
force in the strict sense where the psychologically coerced and entrapped spouse, 
subject to historical cumulative violence, kills the aggressor to avoid the infl iction 
of future, violence, and whilst in such fear.235 The cause célèbre in this regard, and 
a point of departure for numerous academics, is the polarising decision in State v 
Norman,236 a North Carolina case in which a woman who killed her long-time abuser 
while he slept raised a claim of self-defence. Judy Norman had married her husband 
when she was fi fteen because she was pregnant, and for the next 20 years suffered 
appalling physical and psychological abuse, including coercion into prostitution to 
support the family, and if she failed to make a minimum of one hundred dollars 
pay per day she would be beaten. The violence escalated in the days prior to the 
killing. Her husband called her a “bitch” and a “whore”, referred to her as a dog, and 
beat her “most every day”, especially when he was drunk, and when other people 
were around to “show off”.237 Judy was beaten with whatever was handy — his 
fi st, a fl y swatter, a baseball bat, his shoe or a bottle; he put out cigarettes on her 
face; he threw food and drink in her face and refused to let her eat for days at a 
time; he threw glasses, ashtrays and beer bottles at her and once smashed a glass in 
her face.238 Judy was often made to bark like a dog and if she refused, he would beat 
her; he often forced here to sleep on the concrete fl oor of their home and on several 
occasions forced her to eat dog or cat food out of the dog or cat bowl. Judy, after a 
failed suicide attempt, and unsuccessfully trying to summon help from the police and 
local authorities, obtained a gun and shot her husband three times in the head while 
he was sleeping. The majority of the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the 
trial court’s ruling to deny a self-defence instruction because there was no imminent 
danger of serious physical abuse or death when Judy killed her husband.239
233 Dressler, “Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers” (n.202) p.468.
234 See Victoria Nourse “Self-Defence and Subjectivity” (2001) 68 The University of Chicago Law Review 
1235; and Elisabeth Ayyilidiz, “When Battered Woman’s Syndrome Does Not Go Far Enough: The 
Battered Woman as Vigilante” (1995) 4 The American University Journal of Gender and the Law 141.
235 See, generally, Phyllis L Crocker, “The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-
Defense” (1985) 8 Harvard Women’s Law Journal 121.
236 366 SE 2d 586 (NC CA 1988).
237 Ibid., 587.
238 Ibid., 588.
239 Ibid., 589.
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It is contended that the outcome in Norman was inapposite, and that self-
defence constructs, of a partial nature, ought to be promulgated that broaden 
standardisation to justify intentional killings in non-confrontational situations 
provided use of force is necessary to prevent a future attack. This ought to be 
inclusively deconstructed to embrace the psychologically coerced entrapee even 
if the aggression is not technically imminent.240 A partial defence should apply 
to coercees in the situation of Judy Norman. As subsequently adumbrated, a 
new schema is required whereby a reformulated partial defence is designed to sit 
directly beneath self-defence. It would operate to reduce a murder conviction to 
manslaughter where the defendant kills in response to a fear of serious violence 
from the victim against the defendant or another identifi ed individual, and the 
force used is unreasonable on the facts. This refl ects, in part, the remarks of North 
Carolina Supreme Court Justice Harry Martin in his dissent in Norman:
“By his barbaric conduct over the course of twenty years, J.T. Norman 
reduced the quality of the defendant’s life to such an abysmal state that, 
given the opportunity to do so, the jury might well have found that she was 
justifi ed in acting in self-defence for the preservation of her tragic life”.241
The majoritorian perspective in the United States is that utilisation of excessive 
force operates as a bulwark against a full or partial defence for liability.242 There 
are some exemplars, however, of state courts recognising a partial defence when 
primary victim is charged with murder, and jury determination is that the force used 
should be categorised as excessive or unreasonable — the terminology is that of 
“imperfect self-defence”.243 The operational impact of imperfect self-defence is to 
mitigate murder to the lesser culpability offence of manslaughter: the parameters 
of this embryonic conceptualisation is that mitigation applies when the defendant 
reasonably believed that using some force was necessary but she unreasonably used 
more force than was necessary to thwart the attack, or where the actor honestly but 
unreasonably believed that the force was necessary to avert wrongful aggression.244
An iteration of imperfect self-defence doctrine, and constituent elements, was 
vividly exemplifi ed by the District Court of Columbia in Swann.245 The case arose 
240 Ayyilidiz, “When Battered Women’s Syndrome Does Not Go Far Enough” (n.234) p.149: contends that 
the state’s failure to protect women such as Judy Norman constitutes a breach of the social contract; the 
battered woman who kills her abuser should be seen in such a perspective as a spontaneous vigilante 
repairing a fractured moral order. Note that Ayyilidiz ultimately argues for jury nullifi cation, not for an 
expanded self-defence doctrine. (pp.164, 165)
241 State v Norman 378 SE 2d, 8, 21 (NC 1989) (Martin J, dissenting).
242 See Chiesa, “United States of America” (n.220) pp.333–335.
243 Swann (n.224); and see, generally, Stuart Green, “Castles and Carjackers: Proportionality and the Use of 
Deadly Force in Defense of Dwellings and Vehicles” [1999] University of Illinois Law Review 19; and 
Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Self-Defense” (1991) 20 Philosophy and Public Affairs 283.
244 David Wasserman, “Justifying Self-Defense” (1987) 16 Philosophy and Public Affairs 356.
245 Swann (n.224).
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out of a basketball court dispute between the respective parties. The appellant 
testifi ed that he thought that V was about to draw a gun on him so he fi red pre-
emptively with fatal consequences. The principal issue on appeal was whether 
Swann was entitled to a manslaughter instruction on a theory of imperfect self-
defence predicated on the mitigating circumstances.246 An initial altercation had 
occurred when V, aware that the defendant had recently been stabbed, deliberately 
hit him in the stomach with a basketball, then stated, “You think you stabbed 
up now, just watch”.247 Swann claimed that the fatal shot was fi red in a scenario 
where he had a heightened sense of fear since the earlier stabling, and with an 
underpinning appreciation that V had previously killed someone with a gun. The 
District Court determined that, as a general proposition, a theory of imperfect 
self-defence may be applicable.248 The parameters of this nascent common law 
defence invoke consideration of whether a reasonable jury could have found that 
the defendant had a subjective actual belief that his life was in danger, and a like 
belief that he had to react with the force that he did, even though such beliefs were 
objectively unreasonable.249
The outcome in Swann raised the signifi cance of pre-emptive force, conjoined 
together with the focal import of relational evidence of past experiences. These 
pillars are, of course, of particular relevance in cases of battered women and 
prior spousal abuse, and other exemplars of intentional killing in non-directly 
confrontational circumstances. Goetz, for example, was the notorious “subway 
vigilante”, and as a victim of previous muggings, he shot four youths in a New 
York subway when one of them demanded fi ve dollars.250 Nourse has previously 
identifi ed that part of the pre-emptive nature of Goetz’s volitional conduct related 
to framework evidence that the state had previously failed to provide adequate 
protection, and he consequently believed that he needed to protect himself.251 A 
broader contextualisation of the importance of social framework evidence within 
psychological coercive entrapment, is distilled subsequently, but experiential 
issues also played a part before the court in Goetz. The Court of Appeal iterated 
that evidence of prior experiences that are relevant to assessing the defendant’s 
state of mind at the time of the use of force is relevant to the determination whether 
his belief that force was necessary was objectively reasonable.252 Moreover, the 
Court elaborated that the standard that should be developed to assess whether the 
defendant’s belief is reasonable is whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s 
246 Ibid., 929.
247 Ibid.
248 Ibid., 930–931.
249 See, generally, James Q Whitman, “Between Self-Defense and Vengeance/between Social Contract and 
Monopoly of Violence” (2004) 39 Tulsa Law Review 901.
250 See, generally, George P Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense: Bernard Goetz and the Law on Trial 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988).
251 People v Goetz 497 NE 2d 41, 44 (NY 1986), and see Nourse, “Self-Defence and Subjectivity” (n.234).
252 Ibid.
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situation would also have believed that using force was necessary to counteract 
unlawful aggression.253
It is our contention, however, after a comparative review of US theoretical 
and doctrinal precepts, encompassing imperfect self-defence and individuated 
experiential evidence, that the full and partial defence schema should be more 
nuanced. Extant laws fail to appropriately recognise the need for a de novo partial 
self-defence template. Rather than asking whether the psychologically coerced 
entrapee believes that she will be killed or suffer serious injury in every case in order 
to allow/deny any type of defence, the proper question in certain posited situations 
is to ask whether she was put in fear of serious violence in the context of past 
experience. This should be enough for the actor to potentially invoke a partial self-
defence in particularised circumstances, even if she does not believe the next attack 
is likely to take her life as in the case of Judy Norman. This reconceptualisation 
is supported by conditionality of rights and epistemic conceptualisation of risk 
arguments, as previously stated. 
A. A bespoke partial defence 
The English Law Commission, prior to the Coroner and Justice Act 2009 reforms, 
have consistently rejected a specifi c separate partial defence to murder based 
on excessive use of force in self-defence, articulating instead a reformulated 
standardisation for the law of provocation, embracing either fear of serious 
violence or anger.254 In tandem there have been proposals for a reconceptualised 
full defence of duress by threats as a defence to fi rst-degree murder where the 
operative threat is one of death or life-threatening harm. This is viewed as a de novo 
affi rmative defence where the defendant should bear the consequences of proving 
the qualifying conditions of the defence on a balance of probabilities.255
It is signifi cant, however, that the Law Commission have acknowledged 
the perspectives advanced by some academics that English precepts fails to 
assist those abused individuals who kill their coercers when they are asleep or 
otherwise defenceless.256 The coercees under extant law are precluded from being 
able to rely on self-defence because, in order to do so, they need to be able to 
demonstrate that the killing was necessary to resist actual or imminent violence. 
Wells, in this context, has expressed the view that reform should, “contemplate 
a re-thinking of self-defence, and a radical shift in some of the ideas that 
253 Ibid.; see, generally, Victoria Nourse, “Reconceptualising Criminal Law Defenses” (2003) 151 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1691, 1704 asserting that Goetz’s references to previous 
muggings can be interpreted as a contention of necessity for self-protection derived from state failure.
254 Law Commission for England and Wales, Partial Defences to Murder (Law Com No 290, 2004).
255 Law Commission for England and Wales, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304, 
2006).
256 See generally, Aileen McColgan, “In Defence of Battered Women Who Kill” (1993) 13 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 508; and Joshua Dressler, “Provocation: Partial Justifi cation or Partial Excuse” (1988) 
51 Modern Law Review 467.
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underlie it”.257 The paradoxes and contradictions inherent within general defences 
doctrine fails to recognise that familial violence and other types of abuse, do 
not simply invade an individual’s physical integrity, “it is an instrument of 
psychological and emotional control”.258 Clarkson has viewed this issue through a 
broadened prism, propounding a new single defence of “necessary action”.259 The 
focal inquiry herein is whether it is reasonable for the coercee to take pre-emptive 
action and, given the prevailing circumstances, was the force utilised proportionate 
to the danger — in this contextualisation “danger” is given a wider time frame than 
under the present law.260 The challenge remains, however, whether to facilitate a 
partial defence where excessive force is used, and perforce not a “reasonable” and 
“proportionate” reaction to presented danger, but to avoid unfair syndromisation of 
the psychologically entrapped coercee.
It is our contention that even with bespoke provisions dedicated to the unique 
circumstances of family violence, as promulgated by the New Zealand Law 
Commission, some victims of abuse, like Judy Norman, considered above, may 
continue to fi nd themselves bereft of a defence in homicide cases. The reality is that 
even if self-defence is reformed in line with the New Zealand Law Commission 
recommendations, it will not always be available on the facts.261 That is not to say 
that a defence always ought to be available axiomatically to the victim of abuse. 
However, in cases of prolonged and systematic abuse where the victim kills an 
abuser, and self-defence remains unavailable, a partial defence ought to provide 
a potential option.262 Any limitation to family members may serve to exclude 
deserving defendants who fi nd themselves in potentially analogous situations but 
for failing to fall within the identifi ed category. 
(i) Self-preservation 
A new partial defence of general application ought to be introduced to New Zealand. 
A partial defence avoids the stigmatic murder label;263 it may infl uence charging 
practices by encouraging guilty pleas thereby avoiding unnecessary trials or by 
encouraging a trial where self-defence might apply on grounds that the partial 
defence represents a safety-net;264 and, it sends a signal to sentencing judges and 
society regarding culpability levels.265 Importantly, there is evidence that the lack of 
257 Celia Wells, “Battered Woman Syndrome and Defences to Homicide: Where Now” (1994) 14 Legal 
Studies 266, 272.
258 Ibid., p.273.
259 Christopher Clarkson, “Necessary Action: A New Defence” [2004] Crim LR 81, 82.
260 Ibid., pp.90, 91.
261 New Zealand Law Commission, Understanding Family Violence (n.4) para.5.31.
262 New Zealand Law Commission Issues Paper, Victims of Family Violence Who Commit Homicide 
(n.14) p.4, question 14: “Should a new partial defence (or separate homicide offence)-whether of general 
application or specifi c to victims of family violence-be introduced to New Zealand?”
263 Ibid., para.8.5.
264 It is recognised that partial defences may encourage compromise verdicts: Ibid., para.8.10.
265 Ibid., para.8.7.
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a partial defence in New Zealand does not accord with societal expectations of how 
victims of family violence ought to have their victimisation and culpability refl ected 
in criminal offending; manslaughter verdicts are being returned, in cases where there 
is signifi cant evidence of murderous intent. For example, Paton266 was convicted of 
manslaughter after she stabbed the victim in the neck when he challenged her to use 
the knife. Wickham267 was convicted of manslaughter after shooting her abusive 
husband because he “tried to throttle” her again.268 The implementation of a new 
partial defence would reduce current jury nullifi cation practices, and provide a more 
accurate refl ection of the rationale for the verdict returned.
A new self-preservation defence, drawing upon earlier recommendations of 
the Law Commission for England and Wales is advanced. The partial defence is 
complemented by social framework evidence, mandatory juror directions and an 
interlocutory appeal procedure. Importantly, the defence is specifi cally tailored to 
the law in New Zealand. The partial defence operates as an imperfect justifi cation; 
the defendant is justifi ed in responding to an unjust attack, but the overall response 
is wrong.269
The partial defence is designed to sit directly beneath self-defence. It would 
operate to reduce a murder conviction to manslaughter where the defendant kills in 
response to a fear of serious abuse from the victim against the defendant or another 
identifi ed individual, but unlike affi rmative self-defence the lack of an imminent 
threat and the use of excessive force would not necessarily negate the defence. The 
absence of imminence and proportionality requirements are justifi ed on the basis 
that self-preservation is a partial rather than a complete defence. In cases where the 
defendant claims to have held a particular belief as regards the circumstances, 
the reasonableness or otherwise of that belief is relevant to the question whether D 
genuinely held it; there must be an intelligible basis for the belief; if it is determined 
that D did genuinely hold it, and there was an intelligible basis for doing so, D is 
entitled to rely on it for the purposes of the partial defence, whether or not it was 
mistaken, or (if it was mistaken) the mistake was a reasonable one to have made. 
Importantly, the defence does not automatically apply where self-defence fails on 
grounds that the threat was not imminent or the force was excessive, otherwise the 
defence would be overly broad in ambit and subject to similar criticisms that were 
levelled at defensive homicide in Victoria.270 
Appropriate threshold fi lter mechanisms operate to prevent the defence from 
being available in unmeritorious cases. The defence does not apply where the 
266 R v Paton [2013] NZHC 21.
267 NZPA, “Murder-Accused Lived in Fear” Stuff NZ (4 October 2010), available at http://www.stuff.co.nz/
national/crime/4196192/Murder-accused-lived-in-fear (visited 27 June 2016).
268 See, Brenda Midson, “Degrees of Blameworthiness in Culpable Homicide” (2015) 6 New Zealand Law 
Journal 220, 231.
269 Alan Norrie, “The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 — Partial Defences to Murder: (i) Loss of Control” 
[2010] Crim LR 275, 283.
270 See works referred to in note 8.
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defendant intentionally incited serious violence or acted in a considered desire for 
revenge, and is qualifi ed by a normal person test which requires that a person of 
the defendant’s age with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint might have 
reacted in the same or a similar way in the circumstances. Psychiatric conditions 
may be relevant to the normal person test in limited circumstances where the 
condition is especially probative, but evidence of voluntary intoxication remains 
irrelevant. In all cases, the trial judge may decline to leave the defence to the jury on 
the basis that no jury properly directed could reasonably conclude that the defence 
might apply. The manner in which appropriate and inappropriate cases might 
be determined is demonstrated through a critical elucidation and application of 
the newly proposed elements of the defence to the case facts in Wang and Vincent, 
considered above. There were no lasting consequences to the victim’s injuries in 
Vincent,271 but, let us consider that the attack had been fatal.
The fi rst element of the defence requires that the defendant feared serious 
abuse from the victim against the defendant or another identifi ed person. The term 
abuse should be broadly construed as including psychological and sexual harm, in 
addition to physical violence; the victim of abuse’s response to the predominant 
aggressor “does not necessarily follow from the severity of the last act of violence, 
but fl ows from her perception of the severity of the threat he poses to her life”.272 
It is not suffi cient that the defendant feared violence, the level of violence feared 
must be serious. This mirrors the test operating under the loss of control defence 
in England and Wales, and is entirely subjective.273 The Court of Appeal in 
Gurpinar274 distinguished fear of serious violence from fear before engagement in a 
fi ght, highlighting that despite the subjectivity of this limb, it may still be utilised to 
restrict the availability of the defence in appropriate circumstances. The defence is 
supported by social framework evidence, considered further below, relating to the 
nature of abuse. This evidence should be utilised to highlight the impact of coercive 
control,275 and to explain why an ostensibly trivial incident might cause the primary 
victim to fear such abuse; “it is often only when the context...is taken into account 
that seemingly small and trivial incidents can be seen to have a detrimental effect 
on the victim”.276 The fact that the threat may be targeted towards the defendant or 
another identifi ed individual is particularly important, given that primary victims 
may act in defence of their children as well as themselves.277 Similarly, children 
271 Vincent (CA) (n.49), [6].
272 Susan Edwards, “Anger and Fear as Justifi able Preludes to Loss of Self-Control” (2010) 74(3) Journal 
of Criminal Law 223–241.
273 R v Ward [2013] 2 Cr App R (S) 35; R v Davies-Jones [2013] EWCA Crim 2809 and R v Lodge [2013] 
EWCA Crim 987.
274 Gurpinar (n.114).
275 Evan Stark, “Rethinking Coercive Control” (2009) 15(12) Violence Against Women 1509.
276 Bettinson and Bishop, “Is the Creation of a Discrete Offence of Coercive Control Necessary to Combat 
Domestic Violence?” (n.150) p.186.
277 D successfully pleaded Loss of Control after killing V, who had physically attacked D’s brother at a 
house party: Ward (n.273).
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may act in order to defend a parent. As noted, those over the age of 10 may be 
convicted of murder and/or manslaughter in New Zealand should the prosecution 
effectively discharge its burden of proof to the usual criminal standard.
Wang would undoubtedly satisfy the fear of serious abuse element of the 
proposed defence. The psychiatrist, in Wang, stated that Wang believed that the 
predominant aggressor’s threats would be carried out, and that she could see no 
other alternative to the use of force. Whether Vincent could satisfy this aspect of the 
defence is debatable. Their lordships, in Vincent, conceded that:
“It may be that Mr Vincent genuinely believed it was necessary for him to 
take the actions he did in the circumstances as he believed them to be…He 
may have believed that the Corrections personnel at the prison were not 
taking adequate steps to secure his safety”.278
Even with a generous interpretation of the “fear of serious abuse” requirement, it 
does not follow that the defence would be available, since the remaining elements 
of the defence must be satisfi ed.
The proposed defence is qualifi ed by the “normal person” test. This aspect of 
the defence is objective. The test is similar to the “normal person” test operating 
in relation to the loss of control defence, with the exception that “sex” is omitted. 
“Sex” overstates the “role of sex and gender in explaining D’s reaction”.279 It 
encourages problematic stereotyping, in addition to typecasting the reactions of 
men and women. If women are typical victims and men are typical aggressors, 
this is likely to render it more diffi cult for both sexes to claim the defence.280 Sex 
and gender are more appropriately considered as part of the circumstances of the 
case, where disparities between size, strength, and other relevant factors can be 
addressed.
Akin to the loss of control defence, circumstances refer to all the defendant’s 
circumstances other than those whose only relevance is that they bear on the 
defendant’s general capacity for tolerance and self-restraint. Given the fl uidity and 
potential evolution of these terms, it is important to advise jurors that irrational 
prejudices, such as homophobia and racism, and other repugnant characteristics, 
such as aggression and irritability, are excluded.281
The question in both Wang and Vincent would be whether a person of the 
defendant’s age with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint might have 
278 Vincent (CA) (n.49), [33].
279 Neil Cobb and Anna Gausden, “Feminism, ‘Typical’ Women, and Losing Control” in Alan Reed and 
Michael Bohlander (eds), Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and 
International Perspectives (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2011).
280 Ibid.
281 We express our gratitude to the De Montfort Law School staff for making this point. An early version 
of this article was presented to De Montfort Law School; Nicola Wake, Responding to the NZ Law 
Commission: A New Partial Defence (for Primary Victims)? (De Montfort Law School, 2016). 
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reacted in the same or a similar way in the circumstances. It is foreseeable that 
a normal person who has suffered a prolonged history of abuse, and believes 
there is no other option but to kill might react in the same way as Wang. Vincent, 
in contrast, had been placed in a separate management regime to avoid further 
confrontation, but following assurances from both parties, they returned to the 
earlier routine where they were managed together.282 Vincent had the opportunity 
“to seek the assistance of the corrections offi cers” to be returned to the separate 
regime.283 There were four days between the initial altercation and the stabbing, 
during which there was nothing to suggest an increased threat. Vincent’s situation 
is simply incomparable to the pattern of abuse suffered by the intra- and extra-
familial vulnerable individuals identifi ed in Section II, above. Note that Vincent’s 
situation similarly differs from Swann, the US case, in terms of the framework 
factors highlighted by Nourse.
Medical conditions short of insanity are relevant to subjective elements of 
criminal law defences in New Zealand, but not objective elements.284 This is the 
approach adopted in self-defence cases in England and Wales. Medical conditions 
are relevant to the subjective assessment as to whether force is necessary, but not 
in relation to whether the force was reasonable in the circumstances as perceived 
by the defendant. Tony Martin shot two intruders in the back, killing 16-year-old 
Barras. Martin appealed his conviction for murder on grounds that the Court of 
Appeal refused to allow personal characteristics (paranoid personality disorder) to 
be taken into account for the purposes of assessing whether the use of force was 
reasonable in self-defence, despite being relevant to the assessment of whether 
Martin believed force was necessary (it should be noted that Martin’s condition was 
relevant for the purposes of the diminished responsibility defence, considered further 
below). Simester and Sullivan have described the position where mental disorder 
is relevant to the fi rst limb of self-defence but not the second as “untenable”.285 In 
cases involving insane delusions, the implication in both jurisdictions is that they 
should fall to be considered under the insanity defence.286
In the context of the loss of control defence, the Law Commission for England 
and Wales noted that psychiatric conditions and developmental immaturity would 
undermine the normal person tests objectivity. Accordingly, given the objectivity 
of the normal person test, it would appear that medical conditions would not 
be recognised for the purposes of the partial defence under New Zealand law. 
This potentially creates an anomaly in the defence in that psychiatric conditions 
would be relevant to the fear assessment but not the normal person element of the 
defence. There is a clear preference in England and Wales for medical conditions 
282 Vincent (CA) (n.49), [4].
283 Ibid., [33].
284 R v Oakley CA337/05 (22 September 2006); R v Ghabachi [2007] NZCA 285.
285 AP Simester, JR Spencer, GR Sullivan, and GJ Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory 
and Doctrine (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014).
286 R v Oye [2014] 1 WLR 3354.
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to be considered under the alternative defence of diminished responsibility. The 
Ministry of Justice advised that medical conditions are relevant to the diminished 
responsibility defence and not loss of control.287 The position is not black and 
white, however, and hues of grey ought to apply. In an obiter statement, in 
R v Asmelash, the Court of Appeal considered that a recognised medical condition 
may be a relevant circumstance for the purposes of the loss-of control defence 
where it is especially relevant to a qualifying trigger.288 In the context of self-
defence, the Court of Appeal in R v Martin, identifi ed that medical evidence may 
be admissible in limited cases:
“We would not agree that it is appropriate, except in exceptional 
circumstances which would make the evidence especially probative, in 
deciding whether excessive force has been used to take into account whether 
the defendant is suffering from some form of psychiatric condition”.289
It should be borne in mind that New Zealand does not have a diminished 
responsibility defence. The approach adopted in Asmelash and Martin, that medical 
evidence may be relevant where it is “especially probative” might be preferable 
to a purely objective assessment in all cases, but this arguably ought to be left to 
appropriate judicial development. In all cases, the self-preservation defence may 
be supported by social framework evidence and juror directions, which render the 
psychological impact of abuse a relevant circumstance.
In the context of mistaken beliefs, the self-preservation defence provides that 
the reasonableness or otherwise of that belief is relevant to the question whether 
D genuinely held it; there must be an intelligible basis for the belief; if it is 
determined that D did genuinely hold it, and there was an intelligible basis for doing 
so, D is entitled to rely on it for the purposes of the partial defence, whether or not 
it was mistaken, or (if it was mistaken) the mistake was a reasonable one to have 
made. This is aligned with the approach adopted in the context of mistaken belief 
in qualifying triggers for the purposes of loss of control and the former provocation 
defence in England and Wales. The belief did not have to be based on reasonable 
grounds, but the more unreasonable, the less likely there would be an intelligible 
basis for the belief. This engages a two-part test: Were the circumstances such that 
a person of the same age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint might 
make the same mistake? If so, might a person of the same age, with a normal degree 
of tolerance and self-restraint, have reacted in the same or a similar way? The 
intelligible basis test would also circumvent the issues identifi ed by Wright, above, 
in the context of escape avenues in self-defence claims, where the courts have in 
287 Ministry of Justice Consultation Paper, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of 
the Law (MoJ cp19/08, 2008), para.22.
288 [2014] QB 103.
289 [2003] QB 1, 16.
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some cases engaged in a reasonableness rather than a genuineness assessment. The 
test ensures that the normal person test does not preclude deserving cases, while 
ensuring that the defence is not so broad that it can be misused.
It might be suggested that defendants like Martin290 may successfully claim 
the partial defence, given that social framework evidence would introduce 
evidence relating to the recurrent victimisation to which Martin was subjected. It 
must be remembered, however, that despite media outcry291 in response to Martin, 
the evidence suggests that he was an unconvincing witness, and it is unlikely that 
his medical condition would be relevant given that it was not regarded especially 
probative by the Court of Appeal. A balancing exercise must occur since not 
everyone who fears serious violence and uses excessive force would successfully 
claim the defence, because it requires that a normal person might react in the same 
or a similar way.
The proposed defence specifi cally excludes self-induced intoxication for the 
purposes of the normal-person test. It was recognised in Asmelash that the objective 
normal-person test implicitly excludes self-induced intoxication:
“The only relevance of the drunkenness was that it affected [D’s] self-
restraint, and caused him to act in a way in which he would not have acted 
if sober. Such drunkenness was an irrelevant consideration. It may have 
had some relevance to his general capacity for tolerance or self-restraint: 
but no more”.292
A specifi c exclusionary clause in England and Wales might have prevented 
unnecessary litigation. In New Zealand, it serves to reinforce that the normal-
person test is objective in nature, and is in line with intoxication as an evidentiary 
strategy, relevant only to subjective and not objective elements of criminal law 
defences.293The exclusionary clause reinforces the objective nature of the normal 
person test, and is designed to prevent unnecessary litigation as has occurred in 
England and Wales in the context of loss of control.294
The defence is also excluded where the defendant acted in a considered desire 
for revenge. This mirrors the approach adopted domestically in England and Wales. 
The clause operates to prevent the use of the defence in pre-meditated, cold-blooded 
killings. The primary victim who claims “he deserved it!” remains eligible to claim 
the defence because jurors are in a position to distinguish genuine cases involving 
290 Thank you to Omar Madlhoom (De Montfort University) for pointing this out.
291 Anita Biressi and Heather Nunn, “‘An Englishman’s Home...’: Refl ections on the Tony Martin Case” 
(25 September 2002), available at http://www.signsofthetimes.org.uk/biresinu[textonly].html (visited 
20 August 2016). 
292 Asmelash (n.288).
293 Julia Tolmie, “New Zealand” in Reed, Bohlander, Wake and Smith, General Defences in Criminal Law 
(n.160) pp.274–275.
294 Asmelash (n.288).
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an element of retaliation from disingenuous claims. Even if there were a retaliatory 
element in Wang, she would be entitled to the defence. Vincent, in contrast, “had 
effectively removed himself from this separate regime and placed himself back 
into contact” with the victim.295 Vincent had fashioned a makeshift knife for the 
purposes of stabbing the victim.296 The altercation “involving the basketball and the 
ensuing scuffl e had taken place some four days previously and there had been no 
material conduct…since that time that could have increased Mr Vincent’s concerns 
that he was under imminent attack. His actions are more accurately described as 
retaliatory in nature”.297
The defendant’s fear of serious violence is to be disregarded in cases where the 
defendant intentionally incited serious violence, ensuring that the defence is not 
“engineered by him or her through inciting the provocation that led to it”.298 This is 
different from the provision operating under English precepts, which requires not 
only that D incited V’s response but that she did so for the purpose of using it as 
an excuse to use violence. The English provision will arguably only apply where 
D has “formed a premeditated intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm to the 
victim, and incites provocation by the victim so as to provide an opportunity for 
attacking him or her”, and presumably this could be fi ltered out by the considered 
desire for revenge aspect of the partial defence.
The Law Commission for England and Wales was of the view that to exclude 
the partial defence “in the broader sense of self-induced provocation” might 
exclude deserving claims where the incitement was induced by “morally laudable” 
conduct, for example, “standing up for a victim of racism in a racially hostile 
environment”.299 Nevertheless, it is essential that “criminals whose unlawful 
activities expose them to the risk of provocation by others” are unable to avail 
themselves of the defence.300
The new provision seeks to create a balance between deserving and 
undeserving cases. It would not operate where the defendant intentionally incited 
serious violence. The “mere fact that the defendant caused a reaction in others” 
would not result in the defence being excluded. This is important as the primary 
victim may feel responsible for inciting the aggressor’s response, because she 
is aware that doing X makes him angry, but it cannot be said that it was her 
intention to have that effect. This ensures that confrontational circumstances do 
not automatically preclude the partial defence, but where the defendant intends 
to incite serious violence, the defence is precluded. It would prevent the defence 
from being available in cases like Duncan; the defendant successfully claimed 
the loss of control defence after concealing a knife in a carrier bag, and following 
295 Afamasaga (n.48), [33].
296 Ibid., [3].
297 Ibid., [32].
298 Law Commission for England and Wales, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (n.255) para.5.20.
299 Law Commission for England and Wales, Partial Defences to Murder (n.254) para.3.317.
300 Ibid.
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the victim shouting at him before allegedly losing self-control when the victim 
responded by engaging in a knife fi ght. This is a departure from the approach 
adopted in relation to self-induced self-defence which is permitted in both England 
and Wales and New South Wales, but the “tables must have turned”.301 The nature 
of the partial defence requires that self-induced provocation is excluded because a 
normal person of tolerance and self-restraint would not intentionally incite serious 
violence.
There is no loss of self-control requirement in the proposed framework, 
meaning that the defence may be more closely aligned with self-defence. In 
England and Wales, a defendant claiming self-defence may raise self-defence and 
loss of control. The problem is that the defendant will have to revert from alleging 
that she was acting reasonably in the circumstances, to asserting that she lost self-
control. It has been suggested that this may not be such a problem in practice.302 
Nevertheless, the loss of self-control requirement is diffi cult for victims of family 
violence to establish since rarely will the victim lose self-control in a behaviourist 
sense in response to a fear of serious violence.
In all cases, should the outlined threshold fi lter mechanisms of the proposed 
defence be bypassed, the trial judge has the authority to reject a claim on the 
basis that no jury, properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the defence 
might apply. The trial judge is also gatekeeper in relation to self-defence in 
New Zealand:303
“If there is a credible or plausible narrative which might lead the jury to 
entertain the reasonable possibility of self-defence, then the issue should 
be left to the jury. If, on the other hand, the judge is satisfi ed that it would 
be impossible for the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
acted in the defence of himself or herself or another within the terms of 
s 48, then self-defence should be withdrawn from the jury”.304
VI. Procedural and Evidential Issues 
A. Social framework evidence 
The defence is designed to be complemented by the use of social framework evidence. 
With regard to the admission of expert evidence, it is important to note the initial 
utility of “battered woman syndrome” in a forensic context lay in explaining the 
301 Brown v Police [2012] NZHC 1516; For self-induced self-defence see, R v Orrett Duncan Sheffi eld 
Crown Court (26 February 2014).
302 Thank you to Professor Gavin Dingwall (De Montfort University) for making this point.
303 Wang (n.15), 534, citing R v Tavete [1988] 1 NZLR 428 (CA) and R v Kerr [1976] 1 NZLR 335 (CA). 
304 Vincent (CA) (n.49), [30].
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circumstances of the abuse,305 but erroneous, albeit benevolent, application meant 
the term was frequently invoked as a relevant and defi ning characteristic of the 
“reasonable man”306 conceptualisation. The connotations associated with the term, 
and potential for misapplication render its future utility in depicting the nature of 
abuse doubtful, in preference of more gender neutral, and non-stigmatising, social 
framework evidence, considered further below. Importantly, social framework 
evidence engenders a departure from focusing on the psychological impact of the 
abuse, and highlights the relevance of the dynamics of the relationship, strategic 
responses designed to resist, avoid or escape the violence and the ramifi cations of 
those efforts, in addition to social and economic factors pertinent to the abuse.307 
A departure from pathologising the primary victim, and thereby fuelling the “abuse 
excuse” myth is mandated, and social framework evidence provides an appropriate 
route for future development.308
The New Zealand Law Commission recommend that the Evidence Act 2006 
(NZ) should be amended to include provisions based on ss.322J and 322M(2) of 
the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) to provide for a broad range of family violence evidence 
to be admitted in support of claims of self-defence and to make it clear that such 
evidence may be relevant to both the subjective and objective elements of self-
defence in s.48 of the Crimes Act 1961 (NZ). The recommended provision would 
allow the admission of evidence of the nature and dynamics of family violence 
to “dispel myths about family violence that exist within the community”.309 In 
Bracken, the court advocated that once family violence was accepted relevant, 
cross-examination of witnesses directed at matters made relevant by social 
framework evidence constitute adducing admissible evidence. The broader ambit 
of the proposed partial defence advanced herein would require amendments to such 
a provision in order to capture extra-familial homicide cases involving prior abuse. 
This would involve repudiation of the term “family member” and “family” from 
the current wording of the proposal. For example:
“Evidence of family violence, in relation to a person, includes evidence of 
any of the following: (a) the history of the relationship between the person 
and a family member [perpetrator], including violence by the [perpetrator] 
family member towards the person or by the person towards the family 
member [perpetrator] or by the family member [perpetrator] or the person 
in relation to any other family member [vulnerable individual known to 
the person]”.
305 Hickey (1992) 16 Crim LJ 271.
306 R v Thornton (No 2) [1996] 1 WLR 1174.
307 Mary Ann Dutton, “Critique of the ‘Battered Woman Syndrome’ Model” The George Washington 
University, available at http://www.aaets.org/article138.htm (visited 23 June 2016).
308 Ibid.
309 New Zealand Law Commission Issues Paper, Victims of Family Violence Who Commit Homicide 
(n.14) para.6.22.
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Additional clauses would pertain to, inter alia, the impact of coercive and controlling 
behaviour, domestic servitude, traffi cking, and ostensible gang membership.
B. Jury directions 
Unlike the New Zealand Law Commission recommendations which reject specifi c 
juror directions, the proposed partial defence would be supported by express juror 
directions modelled on the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic).310 Where requested 
by the defence, and where relevant, the trial judge must inform the jury that 
self-defence is in issue and that evidence of family violence may be relevant to 
determining whether the defendant acted in self-defence. It is possible for the trial 
judge to decline such a request, but only where there are good reasons to do so, 
for example, unnecessarily demeaning the victim. The following matters may be 
included in the direction:
(1) that family violence:
(a) is not limited to physical abuse and may include sexual abuse and 
psychological abuse;
(b) may involve intimidation, harassment and threats of abuse;
(c) may consist of a single act; and
(d) may consist of separate acts that form part of a pattern of behaviour which 
can amount to abuse even though some or all of those acts may, when 
viewed in isolation, appear to be minor or trivial.
(2) if relevant, that experience shows that:
(a) people may react differently to family violence and there is no typical, 
proper or normal response to family violence; and 
(b) it is not uncommon for a person who has been subjected to family violence:
(i) to stay with an abusive partner after the onset of family violence, or to 
leave and then return to the partner; and
(ii) not to report family violence to police or seek assistance to stop family 
violence.
These juror directions would similarly be amended to capture the broader category 
of vulnerable offender the proposed reforms seek to accommodate. The juror 
directions are designed to complement the social framework evidence provisions, 
assist in counteracting myths surrounding the impact of abuse, and are designedly 
fl exible in order to ensure that the trial judge can tailor individual directions to the 
specifi c facts of the case. These procedures are essential in order to “transform the 
way we collectively think about domestic violence”.311
310 New Zealand Law Commission, Understanding Family Violence (n.4) para.7.97.
311 FVDRC, Fifth Annual Report (n.37) p.13.
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VII. Conclusion 
The Commission’s terms of reference were limited to victims of family violence 
who commit homicide, unless “there are strong reasons for recommending general 
reform and the risk of unintended consequences is low”.312 It is our contention that 
there are compelling reasons for reconceptualising self-defence and introducing a 
bespoke partial defence, complemented by juror directions and the admissibility of 
social framework evidence, to assist vulnerable offenders who kill their abuser(s) 
in a desperate attempt to protect themselves.
Abuse ought to be regarded as a complex form of entrapment whereby a pattern 
of coercive and controlling behaviour is undertaken engendering harm to the victim. 
This form of abuse extends beyond familial relationships, occurring in the contexts 
of human traffi cking, ostensible gang membership, and third party abuse. The 
“similarities and intersections” between domestic violence, human traffi cking and 
other forms of abuse should not be ignored.313 An individual who kills in response 
to victimisation and/or abuse has already been failed by the system. The criminal 
justice system has an obligation to ensure appropriate defences remain an option 
for those individuals who tragically utilise lethal force in an attempt to defend 
themselves from further harm. The threshold test for criminal law defences should 
not differ dependent upon the relationship status of the victim and the perpetrator, 
but ought to focus on individuated culpability levels.
Drawing upon affi rmative and partial self-defence formulations across 
New Zealand, Victoria, Canada, the United States and England and Wales, the 
reconceptualised affi rmative and partial self-defence models advocated herein serve 
to provide an optimal model for appropriate future reform to the legal position in 
New Zealand. A more nuanced approach is deconstructed which would operate to 
ensure that the nature and impact of abuse is more readily understood within the 
criminal justice system, that deserving defendants are not excluded on the basis of 
their relationship status with the abuser, and importantly that the system does not 
fail these vulnerable individuals again; those “who have acted to save their lives 
should not be punished by [murder convictions and] long prison sentences”.314
312 New Zealand Law Commission Issues Paper, Victims of Family Violence Who Commit Homicide 
(n.14) para.7.6.
313 NVDRC “What are the Connections between Domestic Violence and Human Traffi cking?” available 
at http://www.nrcdv.org/dvam/sites/default/fi les2/HumanTraffi cking%26DV-TalkingPointsForm.pdf 
(visited 20 August 2016).
314 Melissa Jeltson, “Should Domestic Violence Victims Go to Prison for Killing Their Abusers?” 
Huffi ngton Post (25 May 2016), available at http://www.huffi ngtonpost.com/entry/domestic-violence-
prison-legislation_us_573deaa3e4b0aee7b8e94236 (visited 20 August 2016).
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